48 Days to February 24th, 2024
Ukraine’s objective: Hold the line
Whenever February 24th approaches, the day Putin ordered his army to invade Ukraine two years ago, my mind keeps hovering around a singular question: What will the Russian army do now?
The way Russian internal propaganda machine has been structured, there are certain things they have to do. The Kremlin’s dominance lies in its absolute control over the information landscape within Russia, leaving no space for dissenting voices to be expressed openly. Truth will be suppressed at any cost.
The biggest weakness is — there are more than 140 million people. Not everyone is going to believe the bull shit all the time. They cannot act, as it will give them a direct one way ticket to a Russian Gulag. But that also does not mean the entire Russian population is dying to lap up the Russia’s state sponsored propaganda machine.
A lying state is going to create a population that is acting out. Kremlin has to keep them that way. Since the war is no way near to be over, Kremlin needs to do three things
- It must persist in recruiting men of working age to sustain Putin’s campaign against Ukraine. However, the pool of willing participants is diminishing. Russia will employ subtle yet assertive strategies to perpetuate its ongoing military enlistment efforts.
- People are feeling the cracks in the Russian economy. The state has to risk inflation and keep pumping money into the economy.
- Combining the first two points and considering the upcoming Russian Presidential election in March, it becomes crucial for the Kremlin to project an air of triumph or instill the perception that the Russian army will emerge victorious.
Russia will fervently seek a pyrrhic victory, whether through widespread devastation in Ukraine showcased as a path to triumph or the capture of a prominent Ukrainian town. This objective might be pursued through either strategic Russian missile strikes or by taking control of a well-known Ukrainian town.
Russia took control of Marinka in November 2023, but it’s a small parcel of land. Making a big deal out of it will invite awkward questions. It’s kinda laughable, and people will definitely poke fun at it.
Did you notice? No victory laps for the Russian military after Marinka — nothing like the massive media hype and celebration that followed the Wagner group’s win in Bakhmut back in May 2023.
Russia will remain in a desperate hunt for a win before February 24th, 2024. Under normal circumstances I would have made the case for U.S. President Biden to quietly work behind the screens to help Ukraine absorb the Russian counterattacks until the end of February and then launch a fierce attack on the Russian lines just as they lose the momentum and resources. Relying on the Biden administration to overcome its fear might not be the best approach.
What can Ukraine do without the capability of long range missiles?
There are a few things they can.
1. Hold. Hold the line.
Ukraine has to revert to near-full defense. Not 100%. But some where closer to 90%. They need to keep the offensive pressure on the Dnipro front in the Kherson sector and Robotyne axis as it will slow down the construction of defensive fortifications behind the current Russian lines of defense. These two sectors are crucial for reaching the Sea of Azov and breaking the land bridge to Crimea.
Apart from these two sectors, Ukraine must maintain a defensive stance along the entire frontline.
2. Defend Avdiivka
Russia will throw everything it has at Avdiivka and Kupiansk.
Avdiivka holds significant importance as a target for the Russian army to win before February 24th. This is well-known, particularly within the Russian ultranationalist community. State media, backed by this community, utilizes attacks on Avdiivka as a constant drumbeat to propagate the idea that the Russian army is not weakened but, in fact, gaining strength and can triumph in this war. The relentless attacks on Avdiivka are expected to persist as part of this narrative.
But Ukraine can defend the city.
Despite the Russian army’s advances since October 10th and having complete fire control over the city, surrounding it from three directions, they couldn’t secure a victory for three months. This situation points towards a protracted war of attrition. The Russians cannot conquer the city without incurring a substantial cost, and Ukraine must ensure they exact that price.
The defense of Avdiivka would have been a lot easier to execute had the United States provided Ukraine the long range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles. This would have forced the Russian army to move its large ammunition depots and warehouses at least 80 miles from the frontline. Considering where the current frontline is, this would mean Russia moving ammo depots deep into Crimea and inside Russian territory.
The impact would have been huge.
It would have been a logistical nightmare for an army that is dependent on mass untrained infantry to attack Ukrainian positions. But that is not going to happen.
Ukraine must stay dependent on the current multiple rocket launcher systems with a range of 40 miles. Ukraine has to pay a whole lot of blood to defend Avdiivka. There is no other choice. They did it in Bakhmut. The town did not fall before extracting a highly disproportionate level of Russian resources. Russia took almost a year to capture the town. It was dour Ukrainian defense. We need a similar performance from Ukraine in Avdiivka.
3. Defend Kupiansk
The reality is, it is not Kupiansk. The town lies in the path to Kharkiv city.
Russians will not stop attacking Kupiansk because Kupiansk is an extremely vital cog in any wheel that tries to reach Kharkiv city. Russia’s actions in the Kupiansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, the only sector where they never stopped attacking since the day they lost Kupiansk last year, is the clearest evidence that Russia is intent on setting the stage to attack Ukraine in the future.
For the next Russian attack on Ukraine to succeed, they must capture Kharkiv city. The fall of the second most populous city in Ukraine will deal a devastating blow Ukraine.
1.5 million people.
Imagine Kharkiv city surrounded by the Russian army in all directions. A total siege will force the town and its defenders to surrender. The resultant humanitarian disaster can wreck the administration in Kyiv. It will force Kyiv on the backfoot.
Russia cannot win Kharkiv, when Ukraine controls Kupiansk and controls both the banks of the Oskil river. The ideal position for the Russian army would be to win Kupiansk, advance to the Oskil river and take control of the of the river.
If I command the Russian army in the next war, provided I control Kupiansk at the start of the war, I will fake an attack on Kyiv, while the full thrust will be to surround Kharkiv city in all four directions. Force the city to surrender, push the western world on the backfoot and then force Kyiv to give up the fight.
The objective will be to win without a huge fight.
Either Kyiv surrenders on its own, or at the very least, they will lose a lot of people. Lot of people with Ukrainian identity.
Ukraine cannot afford to lose Kupiansk. It will be as bad as losing Crimea in 2014. Russia’s victory in Avdiivka will not be strategic. But a win in Kupiansk will be. As a result, Ukraine’s first priority must be to defend Kupiansk and then Avdiivka.
Achieving these three objectives is within Ukraine’s capabilities. It remains feasible even as the American and German administrations withhold their long-range missiles that could swiftly conclude the war. Ukrainian counterattacks should be deferred until after February 24th, 2024. While smaller, gradual advancements are acceptable, larger-scale offensives aimed at liberating extensive territories should be postponed.
