At any cost, Ukraine must win the south

This isn’t the path to victory. It’s the path to long-term peace.

Shankar Narayan
7 min readMar 5, 2023
Licensed Image. Black sketch added by author

Degrade. Deflate and Destroy.

That’s how Ukraine methodically destroyed the Russian settlements anchored to the north/west of Dnieper river in November last year, forcing the Russians to hastily withdraw to the other side of the river.

On paper, Ukraine’s task looked impossible: How can tens of thousands of Russian soldiers be driven out of Kherson without incurring the losses associated with attacking towns and cities?

Original Image by Wikipedia/ Credit: GLRX/ Text and Green Sketches added by author

A Ukrainian attack must move as quickly as possible, and they must also make sure that Russia doesn’t have the time and space to reinforce the troops.

As Ukraine hunted for a weak spot, it found one: The three bridges connecting the Russian settlements to the north and the south of the Dnieper river. Ukraine mercilessly pounded the two main bridges Russians used to cross the Dnieper.

  • Antonivskyi Bridge and
  • Kakhovsky Bridge

Ukraine did not want to destroy the bridges and cut off the escape route for Russian soldiers. It just wanted to damage the bridges so as to choke the supply route. By August, the bridges had become so weak the Russians were using small ships to transport goods across the river.

After that, Ukraine continued to attack the ferries, complicating the lives of Russian soldiers north of the Dnieper. The Russians were forced to count down the days until the attack for months. Early in November, Ukrainian forces began liberating towns in the region, increasing pressure on Russian troops.

The Russian generals knew the situation was dire because they had no way to move reinforcements without fully functional bridges. Encirclement by Ukrainian troops grew by the hour. If Russian troops had surrendered, Putin’s propaganda would have been destroyed, exposing his lies to the Russian people.

Russian generals ordered a withdrawal from Kherson.

The loss of Kherson was “Russia’s third major setback of the war, following retreats from Kyiv, the capital, last spring, and from the Kharkiv region in the northeast in September. Kherson was the only provincial capital Russia had captured since invading in February, and it was a major link in Russia’s effort to control the southern coastline along the Black Sea”.

The Strategic Importance of Dnieper

On November 11th, 2022 “after most Russian forces retreated and just before Ukraine’s forces entered Kherson, “the Antonivsky Bridge, the main crossing over the Dnipro River in the city of Kherson, was blown up.”

Ukraine attacked the river crossings before Russia’s withdrawal, while the Russians attacked the river crossings after their withdrawal. Since the Russians did not want the Ukrainian army to chase them across the river, they blew up the bridges. The fact that the Russians blew up the bridges also demonstrates that they have no plans to cross the river in the future.

By destroying the bridges, both sides have become trapped on either side of the Dnieper.

You cannot control southern Ukraine without offering your deepest respects to the mighty Dnieper. Unlike other sections in the Ukraine map, the war in the south has three main players.

  • Russia
  • Ukraine
  • Dnieper River

From Zaporizhzhia to Kinburn Peninsula, the Russian forces enjoy the protection of the Dnieper river for nearly 300 kilometers. Russians understand the importance of the cover provided by Dnieper, how difficult it is for Ukraine to cross the river and attack Russian settlements south of the river.

Russians are building miles and miles of trenches and defensive structures to slow down Ukraine’s counter attack. “An analysis published in late November by the Institute for the Study of War, an American research group, showed that Russia also built defensive positions deep in southern Kherson in October before it ordered a withdrawal from territory north of the Dnieper River.

Many of the fortifications are designed to protect supply lines that connect southern Kherson to Crimea, the peninsula that Russia illegally annexed in 2014. Losing even one of the two main highways “would likely strain Russian logistics supporting operations” in eastern Kherson and western Zaporizhia, according to the Institute for the Study of War”.

Both Russia and Ukraine understand the importance of Southern Ukraine. Russia is digging in. Ukraine is prowling around the edges probing for weakness.

The Economics of Dnieper

In the south, Dnieper is not merely a strategic boundary that separates Ukrainian and Russian troops, but can be the difference between a good, prosperous, and thriving Ukraine and one that is bitter, struggling, and fighting forever with Russia.

The Dnipro River is the third largest river system in Europe. It is 2145 km long with a drainage basin of 504,000 km2. The Dnipro Basin is a unique ecosystem sustaining a rich biological diversity and the primary fresh water supply for 35 millions of Ukrainians. The Dnipro is an important navigable waterway, connected via the Dnipro–Bug Canal to other waterways in Europe.

The six hydroelectric stations spread all over the Dnieper river account for 10% of Ukraine’s electricity. After the war, whichever side controls the Dnieper and the Black Sea will also control the Ukrainian economy.

Crimea

The Russian annexation of Crimea crippled Ukraine in way beyond imagination, and it also laid the groundwork for the current conflict.

MEI’s Frontier Europe Initiative fellow, Maryna Parfenchuk, explained how Crimea’s loss has affected Ukraine:

“Russia seized almost 75 percent of Ukraine’s maritime personnel, and along with this important services like signals-intelligence, training, administration, maintenance, and logistics infrastructure. Ukraine has been unable to rebuild its navy due to a gap in the government’s rhetorical commitment and actual funding capabilities, much of which currently prioritizes the defence of Eastern Ukraine.

So, while Ukraine’s 2016 defence budget was four times higher than in 2014, and continues to increase, the country’s navy’s budget equates to just 2 percent of the defence ministry’s total budget and only 0.5 percent of the total budget on procuring weapons and military equipment for the fleet.

Ukraine’s inability to invest in rebuilding its naval fleet in the Black Sea is also connected to the economic losses of the annexation of Crimea (3.6 to 3.7 percent of national GDP between 2001 and 2012). Furthermore, the loss of Crimea and Russian control over the Kerch Strait also led to a short-term loss of grain export partners because the country was now deprived of 10 percent of its export capacity without the Black Sea ports”.

By losing Crimea, Ukraine’s economy shrank, while Russia gained a lot of strategic impetus to wage the current conflict. Because of the securely connected supply routes to Crimea, Russia’s occupation forces are able to hold southern Ukraine to this day. Without those routes, Ukraine would have liberated southern Ukraine by now.

The importance of liberating Southern Ukraine

Like a rat nibbling the cake and returning to eat more next day, Putin has been eating Ukraine piece by piece. In 2014, the United States and Germany maintained a strategic silence after Putin invaded Ukraine. This led us here today.

Had they forced Vladimir Putin to pay a heavy price for his decision to invade Crimea, we may not have been discussing about the Russian war today.

But here we are, eight years later, talking about a full-scale Russian war and why Putin is desperate to hold Southern Ukraine. The long lines of defensive structures he has built in the south is clear evidence that he will be ready to sacrifice as many Russians as possible to win southern Ukraine.

If he holds Southern Ukraine after the war, it will become easy for him to invade Ukraine the next time. Putin will try to crush Ukraine from three different directions, while also arriving at the doorsteps of Europe which isn’t that far away from Odesa.

Putin tried his best to capture Odesa during the early stages of the 2022 Ukraine war, but his overstretched army did not give him the liberty to attack that far. But if and when he comes back for more Ukrainian land, we can be assured of an immediate attack on Odesa.

  • Europe is the whole reason why Putin is in Ukraine.
  • Crimea is the only reason why he is still out there fighting.
  • Take that piece of land out of his hand, the world can rest in peace for many more decades. Give it up, then be prepared to pay a heavier price the next time.
February 25, 2022 Russian advance: Putin launched his southern invasion of Ukraine from Crimea. Image by Wikipedia

In addition to driving the Russians out of southern Ukraine, the west needs to allow Ukraine to extend its attack into Crimea. In the absence of a solution for the 2014 error, autocrats are likely to continue harming the world.

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Shankar Narayan
Shankar Narayan

Written by Shankar Narayan

He didn't care what he had or what he had left, he cared only about what he must do.

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