How Ukraine Can Win the Battle for Kursk
Step by step
I understand this is war. Countless human lives are being sacrificed for one man’s dream. I know what I’m about to say might not sound right at all, but I’m going to say it because it’s the thought that keeps running in the back of my mind. It’s the truth. So, I’m going to say it.
I laugh every day watching the Kremlin and Washington, D.C. running around clueless about Ukraine’s intentions. They have no idea whatsoever. We can see this from the way the Kremlin is responding to this incursion.
Washington, D.C.’s official stance remains this: “We are talking to Ukraine to understand their objectives in Kursk.” I guess Ukranians aren’t telling them anything, are they?
The level of unknowns we have regarding Ukraine’s strategy in Kursk is extremely high. That’s the beauty of the plan. It’s dynamic. Nothing is set in stone. They’ve probably mapped out the entire operation, step by step, leaving enough room for the other side to respond. Depending on the response, they will adjust. Of course, there will always be risks involved, but in Ukraine’s case, the biggest risk remains the amount of weaponry supplied by the United States and other Western partners.
Let’s assume, for the sake of this story, that the United States continues to provide robust support to Ukraine. They keep sending artillery shells and air defense missiles right off the production line, just as President Biden promised during the G7 summit.
The second biggest threat Ukraine faces in this offensive operation is the frontline advancing too far ahead. This was the mistake the Russians made in February–April 2022, when they tried to take as much Ukrainian land as possible without properly considering supplies and logistics.
A two-hour distance from the Ukrainian border to the frontline will remain my self-imposed boundary. This will allow me to rapidly move in and out of the territory. My forces will always know that home is just a couple of hours away. It will also enable me to keep expanding the frontline inside Russia. Little by little, I can shift the war from being waged inside Ukraine to inside Russia.
So far, Ukraine’s maximum depth inside Kursk has not extended far beyond their border. It is still within a 2-hour reach for supply trucks and armored personnel carriers.
Now that I have advanced, my main objective in this entire operation is to force Russia to move its troops out of Ukraine and into Russia. The Kremlin has done just that. On August 22, the ISW reported on the Russian redeployment efforts:
The Russian military command recently redeployed elements of at least one Russian airborne (VDV) regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast in response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, possibly in an effort to stabilize the lines and improve command and control (C2) over Russian conscripts
It wasn’t just one regiment. From what I’ve observed, Russia has moved close to 10,000 personnel to Kursk. However, they are trying to balance their forces between the older frontline and Kursk, which reduces the overall density of Russian troops operating in Ukraine.
Let’s say Russia had 500,000 troops at the older frontline, including reserves, support, combat, engineering, and everything else. In modern military operations, a common ratio is about 3:1 or even 4:1 in favor of support troops. This means that for every 10,000 frontline combat troops, you will need between 30,000 to 40,000 support troops.
This is, once again, a huge underestimation. Ukraine has deployed at least 10,000 troops to Kursk, with the option to increase further. To evict them, Russia needs at least three times that number at the front, meaning they would need to find 100,000 troops (frontline + support) for Kursk.
That’s the number today. This will reduce the force density on the older frontline (assuming half a million troops are stationed there) by a massive 20%.
Putin is probably thinking, “No, we don’t have that many troops, so let’s send half. Send 50,000. Control the information flow into Russia and act as if nothing is a big deal.”
In this case, Ukraine can further extend the frontline to increase pressure on Russia to respond. Let’s go back to the limitations we established before: no more than two hours from the border.
Take a look at this.
Ukraine can push toward the Russian town of Rylsk along the E38 highway. One group can advance from the east while another strikes from the south, forcing anything in the middle to fight from within. It won’t be an easy task, as the Russians are anticipating this attack and are busy building trenches along the E38 highway, but they do not have enough troops to defend the line.
But I will choose this option only if Russia continues to refuse to bring in the number of troops I want them to deploy. So, it’s an option I can exercise, not a necessity.
Now, let’s assume Russia does present 100,000 troops to Kursk. In that case, I will dig in as much as possible in Kursk, building trenchline after trenchline and presenting a dogged defense. The priority will be to hold what is already under control. Once continuous defensive barriers are established, I’ll keep extending the lines. There’s no need to rush the expansion; if there are no Russian troops blocking my left and right flanks, I’ll just add 100 meters here and 100 meters there. Meter by meter, the frontline will expand inside Russia, while the Russian force density on the older frontline will continue to decrease.
This opens up another set of options. As Russia begins moving troops from the older frontline, those lines will gradually weaken. At this stage, Ukraine can launch another set of localized counterattacks on the older frontline. If there aren’t enough Russian troops, those lines could break.
However, I would wait for a considerable period before striking the older frontline unless intelligence indicates a clear opening to exploit. I don’t see one yet, but it will emerge.
I also want to stress that the pincer movement toward Rylsk is just one of many options Ukraine has in Kursk. They still have plenty. I will only discuss operational details when I’m certain the Russians are already aware of them.
Ukraine can easily draw 20% of Russian troops from the older frontline to Kursk, which would completely upend the war. The only real weakness is the supply of weapons. Nothing else. If Ukraine is given the weapons, they will force Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and redeploy them on their own soil.
I just want to leave you with this: I am one person with limited resources. I rely solely on public data to derive my conclusions. I don’t have access to the kind of data that those in suits, sitting in temperature controlled offices, have.
On July 15th, 2024………….. I wrote this:
These were the reasons why I wrote at least twice in the recent past that Ukraine will first stall the Russian advance and start localized counter-offensive actions across the theater. There won’t be any need to launch a massive counter-offensive operations as the enemy lines will start to weaken on its own, creating those openings to breakthrough.
I even suggested where these openings will be created: In all the sectors where the Russians had advanced since the beginning of this year, with northeast becoming their primary weakness.
I am glad to report to you that Russian combat power is starting to come down. Their reserve strength is starting to weaken.
How can Washington, D.C. not see this?
I really don’t understand.
Thanks for reading. Making critical information on Ukraine accessible is one way to fight misinformation. That’s why I’ve made 253 stories free to the public in 2024, including this one.
