Putin’s Endless Trouble in Kursk is Just About to Start
It will keep getting worse
It has been two months and a week since Ukraine invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast. After initially downplaying the situation, Putin quietly mobilized troops from various parts of occupied Ukraine and Kaliningrad to counter the Ukrainian forces in Kursk.
The number of Russian troops increased from 10,000 in August to 30,000, in September and it has now reached 50,000. An additional 10,000 are already on the move to Kursk. The Russians have no choice but to raise this number, as what is currently stationed there, along with the reinforcements, will still not be enough to push the Ukrainian forces out of Kursk.
In September, I noted that Russia would need to shift more troops to the south of the Seym River, which they have done, moving a significant number of their well-equipped units to this section.
So, why am I saying the Russians still do not have enough, despite relocating more than 10% of their troops from the older frontline?
The problem is two fold:
- The map
- Ukraine’s decision to hold its reserves and not commit them
As shown in the map below, Ukraine has deployed more than a dozen battalions from various brigades in Kursk, with an estimated force of around 15,000 troops. These forces are largely concentrated within a 750 to 1,000 square kilometer area, though some units are stationed outside this zone. Ukraine has not been attempting to push further.
When Ukraine breached the border in August, I recommended a maximum advance of 40 to 50 kilometers from the frontline — a limit I still believe is in Ukraine’s best interest. The reasoning is simple: within 50 kilometers, supply trucks, recovery vehicles, and equipment can reach the frontline from the border in under two hours. Ukrainian artillery and first-person view drones can also maintain effective coverage over the entire frontline within this range.
Currently, Ukraine’s positions in Kursk remain well below this threshold, approximately 30 kilometers from the border. Rather than advancing, Ukraine is holding a defensive stance, with troops both inside and outside the concentrated area. To dislodge a well-entrenched defender, an attacker typically needs three times the defending force. While Russia’s glide bombs might reduce this requirement, their ground forces’ lack of mobility offsets that advantage. Therefore, we can reasonably assume the 3-to-1 force ratio as necessary for Russian forces to evict Ukraine from Kursk.
Ukraine currently has five fully equipped brigades in reserve, without including the highly lethal and well-prepared Anne de Kiev Brigade, which is on standby. While I wouldn’t recommend deploying the Anne de Kiev Brigade to Kursk, it’s important to note that the capacity is available, bringing the total reserve to six brigades.
If the situation in Kursk begins to destabilize, Ukraine can quickly reinforce the area by deploying an additional brigade. These reinforcements can approach from the south, east, or west — essentially from any direction except the north. The frontline is easily accessible via roads, less than an hour’s drive from the border, well within the range of Ukrainian artillery, and constantly monitored by Ukrainian drones.
To maintain the current balance in Kursk, Ukraine only needs to deploy one brigade for every three that Russia commits.
Let’s break down the numbers: if Russia doubles its troop presence in Kursk from 50,000 to 100,000, Ukraine would need to increase its own troop numbers from around 15,000 to 30,000 — requiring the addition of just three brigades. Even in this scenario, Ukraine’s lines would hold firm, despite intensified fighting. Russia would have moved a quarter of its forces from other frontlines and still wouldn’t be able to dislodge Ukraine from Kursk.
At that point, with 100,000 Russian troops concentrated in Kursk, it’s likely the Russian positions along the older frontlines will start to weaken. Ukraine needs to stay the course — its current strategy is working.
What if Putin calls Ukraine’s bluff and refuses to send more troops to Kursk?
At that point, it would be the perfect time to deploy Ukraine’s most lethal brigades to Kursk — not to reinforce the defensive lines, which would already be secure if Russia isn’t sending additional troops into the area — but to launch a strategic offensive. Ukraine could target the small Russian town of Rylsk, located just 30 kilometers north of the Ukrainian border, beyond the Seym River.
If Ukraine were to make this move, it would create utter chaos for Russian forces. The troops stationed south of the Seym River would find themselves in serious trouble, with the entire area west of Ukraine’s current occupation zone in Kursk becoming a deadly kill zone, cutting off any clear escape routes.
Putin would have no choice but to respond to such an incursion toward Rylsk. The political ramifications alone would be severe. Having previously downplayed Ukraine’s presence in Kursk, claiming it would soon be dealt with, the loss of additional Russian territory would be a major blow. In response, Putin would be forced to increase troop strength in Kursk, and this pressure would compel him to keep bolstering forces there.
But why is 100,000 troops a critical number for Kursk? Actually, it’s not just crucial for Kursk, but for the entire war. Russia currently has around half a million troops stationed in occupied Ukraine, a number that has remained relatively static over the past year due to significant recruitment struggles. This number is necessary to maintain their lines and conduct limited counterattacks.
If Russia is forced to pull a quarter of these troops from other occupied regions to reinforce Kursk, they will first lose their ability to advance, and eventually their ability to defend will start to crumble.
That’s why I’ve consistently argued that Ukraine shouldn’t be overly concerned with losing small amounts of territory along the older frontlines. Building up reserve capacity while depleting Russia’s is far more important than holding specific areas. Temporary losses are a minor issue if it brings Ukraine closer to victory.
In every way, Ukraine’s decision to advance into Kursk is simply brilliant. They did not overplay their hand. For every possible move Putin could make, Ukraine already has a counter. It’s a masterful trap, and Putin has no good options left.
Thanks for reading. The war is getting closer to the end. Now, more than ever, it’s crucial to make critical information about Ukraine accessible. That’s why I’ve made 300 stories available to the public in 2024, including this one.
