Russia Hits the State of Unsustainable Losses
Something has to give
Vladimir Putin’s army is getting smashed at a rate faster than ever.
An intelligence report from the U.K. Ministry of Defense, dated December 30th, 2023, highlighted a major trend: Throughout 2023, the average daily count of Russian casualties (including both killed and wounded) in Ukraine has surged by nearly 300 compared to the previous year, 2022.
This is not an unexpected outcome.
We are almost two years into the war. Putin ordered closer to 80% of Russian combat units to roll into Ukraine when the invasion started. That Russian military, one that was trained for years, was done in a long time ago. The length of the Ukrainian frontline, stretching for more than 600 miles, requires immense manpower to effectively defend and secure against Ukrainian advance.
Ukraine’s counteroffensive strategies over the past two years have been strategically focused on specific sectors. Throughout the majority of this conflict, Ukrainian forces have primarily adopted a defensive stance, skillfully countering Russian positions through targeted and brief offensives in specific locations. The nature of defensive actions inherently results in fewer resource losses compared to the more resource-intensive efforts of attackers.
Due to this Ukraine lost a lot less than Russia.
Putin’s victory in Bakhmut, which took over a year to accomplish, exacted a staggering toll of more than 50,000 Russian soldiers. Russia invested substantial resources in pursuit of incremental successes.
We know about Russian counterattacks last winter, then saw them throw in waves of troops in Bakhmut for the first half of the year. After that, the Russian army tried waves of machinzed assaults in Avdiivka come October. When that didn’t cut it, they pivoted to infantry attacks, and when even that fell short, they went all in with a mix of both.
The yield for all these attacks were two towns:
Bakhmut and Marinka.
Untrained troops die faster
The United States National Guard is a reserve component of the United States Army and Air Force. On their website, the National guard says it takes ten weeks, for the recruits to get basic combat training. After this, the trainees clear a fitness test. The ones who clear the fitness test make it to Advanced individual training, also known as occupational specialty.
In total, the process from initial enlistment to becoming a fully trained and assigned National Guard member can take several months, typically ranging from six months to a year or more. This is a fairly normal time period for any professional military to train their troops and get them combat ready.
The average time a Russian conscript gets to live in Ukraine is a mere 4.5 months, which is less than half the duration needed for a standard conscript to become combat-ready. Sending an undertrained Russian soldier, unprepared and lacking any intent to engage in combat, to the frontline inevitably spells a fate of premature demise.
Russia’s relentless and thoughtless counterattacks escalate the death toll, necessitating a swift replenishment of forces. The urgency to deploy replacements to the frontline promptly is vital for sustaining the current force density. This cycle will inevitably shrink over time, forming the only viable course of action: shorten the training period.
As you initiate the recruitment cycle, the initial focus naturally falls on securing the finest recruits — individuals who are healthy, young, and eager to engage in combat. However, as the cycle progresses, the imperative to sustain a robust force prompts a broadening of the talent pool. This involves a gradual relaxation of entry criteria, including age limits and medical prerequisites, among other considerations.
The quality of recruits this year will be notably inferior to the previous year’s, and the recruits for the upcoming year will be even less capable than the current batch. This pattern is unavoidable. Each new iteration of the Russian military is bound to be less trained, less equipped, and less motivated to engage in combat. The accelerated attrition rates will intensify the strain on recruitment efforts.
This explains the U.K. Ministry of Defense’s evaluation, indicating a surge in combat deaths by 300 per day this year compared to the previous year. I expect substantial increase in Russian casualties in 2024.
Why is this not sustainable?
The Russian economy is taking a beating this year compared to the last one. Inflation has gone crazy in the past twelve months, and Russia is running short of 4.8 million workers in 2023. Now, if the daily death rate has surged by 300, let’s assume that’s a 20% bump from last year. That puts Russia on track to be short of over 6 million workers in 2024. But, truth be told, the actual number is likely way higher.
The Russian economy is in no shape, form or condition to lose 50,000 workers to the war every month. But that is where they are now. If they continue their aggressive frontline efforts, which I believe they have no choice but to do until the Presidential elections in March, they will push the country ever close to a collapse.
This is trap Russia created on its own.
By relentlessly pursuing Avdiivka, they have made the entire Russian ultranationalist community rally behind their efforts. Kremlin will try to spin this in as many different waves as it can on the public sphere, but behind the screens the pressure will remain intense to get that victory before Russia votes in March.
The Russian army does not have the space to cease its attacks on Avdiivka. As a result, they are going to keep sending barely trained recruits to the frontline at a much faster rate in the future.
The enemy is weak and he is losing the war he started due to the pressure on the economy.
But there are a few things the west has to do, to make sure that this emerging weakness is exploited. That is the only thing that remains Ukraine’s Achilles heel.
If there ever was a time to load up Ukraine, that time would be now. Though the White House wants us to believe that there is no money left in the pot to help Ukraine, the reality is — the Biden administration has nearly $4.4 billion left to access through Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)
In an update released on December 19th, 2023, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, said “DOD still has about $4.4 billion in drawdown authority remaining after December’s $400 million aid packages, even though funds to replace these transferred items are exhausted. In theory, DOD could keep sending weapons and munitions. There is no statutory requirement to replace equipment sent to allies under this authority”.
There is money.
There are weapons.
The world needs President Biden’s willingness to bring this war to an end.
While the challenges are formidable, the West’s support, both financially and strategically, can significantly impact the outcome of the conflict. It is crucial to learn from past instances where critical aid was withheld, allowing Russia to regroup. The opportunity to decisively aid Ukraine and bring an end to the occupation forces is at hand, and the West must not repeat past mistakes.
