Russia Refills in Avdiivka
Never stop an enemy who is bent on making a mistake
Slaughter-fest.
That’s how U.S. General Mark Milley, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, characterized the Russian strategy to conquer Bakhmut last year. He didn’t craft his assessment to embellish his presentation before the House Armed Services Committee.
The deceased Wagner Chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, erected a grim tableau of fallen bodies, standing defiantly before them. In a furious outburst laced with profanities, he castigated the Russian military high command for their failure to provide the necessary ammunition for the Bakhmut battle.
The ex-defense minister of the purported Donbas Republic Russia sought to establish in Ukraine dismissed the Russian strategy in Vulhedar in February 2023 as an act of “morons”, labeling it as the senseless sacrifice of countless Russian lives for the acquisition of desolate territories. Major General Teplinsky, the Russian Commander of the Dnipro sector, echoed these sentiments, repeatedly questioning the wisdom of claiming land devoid of strategic significance.
Their assessments proved accurate. Nearly eight months have elapsed since Russia gained control of Bakhmut. Here is the current state of Russian control in Bakhmut sector.
The Russian army was not allowed to advance from Bakhmut. Substantial losses occurred on the southern flank, with minor setbacks in the north, partially recovered. The ongoing conflict persists in the sector. This is the outcome of Russia’s sacrifice of tens of thousands of soldiers to secure Bakhmut.
We should never underestimate the Kremlin’s willingness to pay any amount of human cost to win something. The Russian army is now preparing to repeat their 2023 Bakhmut strategy in Avdiivka.
On 25th January, ISW reported the latest iteration of Russian strategy to push Ukraine from Avdiivka:
- Russian forces appear to be preparing to fight their way through Avdiivka after failing to encircle the settlement. Russian forces have recently focused offensive operations on the southern residential area of Avdiivka and have made marginal gains there.
- Russian forces are still attacking against Avdiivka northern and southern flanks but at a tempo far below the scale of the initial waves of Russian mechanized assaults on Avdiivka flanks in fall 2023.
- The overall tempo of Russian offensive operations suggests that Russian forces have prioritized fighting through Avdiivka block-by-block from the town’s southern residential area instead of trying to further encircle the settlement from further southwest or to the north, where Russian forces have made only limited gains.
Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs Major Maxim Morozov said last week week that Russian forces have amassed 40,000 troops near Avdiivka. Over the last several months, Russia has been trying to maintain heavy troop density in the region.
The initial Russian strategy, commencing on October 10th, 2023, aimed to circumvent Ukrainian defenders within Avdiivka. The plan involved breaching the flanks, severing Ukrainian supply routes into the city, and compelling the defenders to surrender without engaging in direct conflict. A sensible approach, yet I predicted back then that the Russian strategy would ultimately prove unsuccessful.
On October 13th, I wrote that Russia will find it difficult to dislodge Ukrainians from the town: “Avdiivka happens to be one of the most fiercely contested areas on the occupation map. Ukraine’s well-fortified defensive positions within the town, combined with their improving grasp of the terrain, are becoming increasingly evident”.
The Russian army began their attacks with armored columns, continuing for weeks and rapidly losing battalions worth of troops and equipment. Shifting strategies, they mixed infantry attacks and mechanized columns. Further attempts included bite-sized infantry assaults, all backed by the Russian air force.
They have tried every method in the book and outside the book. The UK Ministry of defense said last week that the Russian forces are “attempting to bypass Ukrainian fortifications by entering the city edges via service tunnels; this is a method of infiltration they have been attempting since October 2023”.
In essence, their approach involved attempting to enter the city while simultaneously trying to encircle it.
The mighty Kremlin, with the capability of mobilizing 1,000 soldiers daily, having acquired 1 million artillery shells from North Korea, maintaining a regular supply of Shahed drones from Iran, and boasting half a million soldiers in occupied territory, is still struggling to dislodge a small group of Ukrainian soldiers entrenched within a town measuring no more than 11 square miles, equivalent to half the size of Manhattan Island.
Nonetheless, Russia aims to implement its successful Bakhmut strategy. However, the effectiveness of this approach is questionable, as it overlooks the specific circumstances present in Bakhmut at that time and the unique capabilities of the Wagner Mercenaries, which the Russian army will find challenging to replicate.
- Wagner Chief Prigozhin did not give a damn about his soldiers
He’ll dispatch inadequately trained convicts into the firing zone, primarily to identify Ukrainian positions. Following this, they will adjust artillery fire to eliminate those positions. Subsequently, another wave of cannon fodder will be sent into the firing zone, followed by another round of artillery. This cycle will persist for a while until well-trained troops are finally deployed to engage the fatigued Ukrainian forces.
With each block Ukraine conceded, it came at the cost of inflicting a significant toll on the Russians.
Prigozhin extensively employed convicts as his cannon fodder. The casualty rates were so alarming that the Wagner group established its own cemeteries in numerous locations throughout Russia.
Russia has already run through its prison:
- Russian officials reported that as of October 2023 the Russian prison population was 266,000 people — a notable reduction of 54,000 prisoners from January 2023.
- The loss of convict recruits to attritional assaults in Ukraine and the relatively short terms of their service contracts may have prompted the Kremlin to enact more restrictive terms of service in order to retain more convict recruits at the front in Ukraine.
- The contract terms for service in new “Storm-V” units are far less attractive and may dampen efforts to recruit convicts, although Russian officials have routinely used coercive measures to force convicts to sign contracts.
The Russian military cannot match the reliance on convicts seen in the Wagner Group. If they resort to using conscripts as cannon fodder, the influx of casualties would be too overwhelming to conceal. Opting out of the “meat grinder” strategy would allow Ukraine to hold fortified positions, enabling them to sustain prolonged resistance.
2. Ukraine had good reason to quit Bakhmut.
The Wagner group took control of Bakhmut in the last week of May 2023. Ukraine’s counter offensive operations began on June 4th.
If my recollection is accurate, Ukraine intensified its operations in over 20 locations along the frontline. With ample resources, including more than 30,000 Western-trained troops and a substantial arsenal, they refrained from confronting the Russians in Bakhmut. The strategic consideration was evident — what would they gain? Perhaps territorial advancement into Luhansk, but the potential consequences, including further challenges breaking the Russian hold in Southern Ukraine and reaching Crimea, outweighed the immediate benefits.
The conditions that existed in the middle of last year do not exist today.
The Russian army lacks the strategic flexibility exhibited by the Wagner Mercenary group. Ukraine faces a shortage of artillery, and their preference lies in engaging in a pocketed battle rather than an extensive frontline conflict. If the Russians are willing to grant them such an opportunity, then Ukraine should seize it with gratitude.
What should Ukraine do?
Ukraine must effectively manage the frontline, persist in their assault on the Russian air force, and intensify attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The significant challenge weighing on Ukraine is the stark shortage of artillery shells compared to Russia, granting the Russians a distinct advantage. Given these circumstances, the prospect of advancing is nearly impossible. Prioritizing a defensive stance is the optimal course of action until a balance in resources is reestablished.
My optimism about Europe rectifying the imbalance has grown, thanks to certain developments from Finland and Germany. I’ll provide more details on this in my next piece.
The challenge for Ukraine is to withstand Russian pressure from now until the situation on the artillery front improves. Russia will be in a desperate hunt for a win by February 24th, the third anniversary of Putin’s three-day invasion. This desire is further fueled by the fact that Russia will be heading for a Presidential election on March 17th. The Russian military will be desperate to show something to the Czar.
Ukraine must bear a cost, and it might involve the loss of a few villages. In my view, the following three locations will be at the top of the list of places they cannot afford to lose.
- Kupiansk
- Klischivka
- Avdiivka
Yup. Avdiivka is not a big deal. It is important because Kremlin is stuck up on it. Other than that, it is not a town of huge strategic value. But losing Kupiansk will change Ukraine’s future.
