Russian plan: Defend the South. Attack the East
A decent strategy to freeze the frontlines
In the last nine months, from May 10, 2023, to February 6 and 10, 2024 the Russian army has built a railway centipede. A 30km long train, 2100 frieght cars standing on the railway line between Olenivka (south of Donetsk City) to Volnovakha (southeast of Vuhledar and north of Mariupol).
This stretch, spanning from Olenivka to Volnovakha, marks the meeting point of the occupied territories in Southern and Eastern Ukraine — a junction where the conflict dynamic shifts. Unlike traditional fortifications typically seen in Southern Ukraine, the Russian forces have adopted a more creative approach. They’ve established a 30km long metal barricade, serving as a defensive line. This barrier poses a significant obstacle for any Ukrainian troops seeking to advance, as they would need to contend with the presence of Russian forces positioned behind it.
While it may not yield the same results as intricate trench mazes, this innovative approach still provides a substantial deterrent against Ukrainian advances. Russian forces are likely to further bolster their defenses by mining the surrounding areas of the railway centipede, heightening the challenge for Ukrainian forces attempting to breach the railway line.
Not a bad idea at all.
Securing victory in Southern Ukraine is paramount for Ukraine’s future security. Unless regions like Kherson Oblast and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, along with Crimea, are liberated, Ukraine will remain vulnerable to perpetual Kremlin threats and instability.
We can observe the Ukrainian armed forces actively addressing this necessity. Since June 2023, their offensives on the frontline have consistently targeted Southern Ukraine. The entirety of the red line depicted on the map indicates Ukraine’s continuous push for advancement in this crucial region.
By extending the defensive line beyond Southern Ukraine to encompass the 30km section between Olenivka and Volnovakha, the Russian army has established a fortified position stretching from Donetsk City to the westernmost edge of their occupied territory.
The question of why Russia would undertake such actions might be misguided. Instead, it’s more pertinent to ask why Russia wouldn’t take such steps. Both Ukraine and Russia are constantly adapting to the evolving battlefield conditions, operating within the context of a dynamic environment rather than in isolation.
The string of defeats suffered by Russia in late 2022 prompted them to construct defensive lines to prevent a recurrence of such catastrophic failures. The defensive structures erected in 2023 enable Russia to optimize its troop deployment. Utilizing inexperienced conscripts to fill trenches proves more effective than attempting a decentralized mobile defense with unwilling soldiers. By mining extensive stretches of territory and constructing waves of trenches occupied by conscripts armed with automatic rifles, Russia can withstand Ukraine’s infantry-based assaults. If Ukraine brings out the heavy machinery, Russia will respond with drones.
It works.
Ukraine probably lost too much blood and equipment in the Robotyne axis, which prompted them to stall their advance. Those lines have been stuck at or around the same mile for more than three months.
Every month Russia stays in Ukraine, they will continue building defensive barriers. It is highly likely that they will also construct more barriers deep inside the occupied territory.
While the Kremlin aims to convey the impression of continued advancement, I believe their offensive actions are primarily geared toward defending the occupied territory. By launching attacks in the east, Russia shifts the pressure onto Ukraine. This strategy results in higher casualties and equipment losses for both sides, given that the battlefield operates in a mode that is half attack and half defense.
Not a bad strategy from the Russian perspective.
Can Ukraine break this?
The first thing we need to understand and accept is that Russia will be more than willing to mine every inch of the occupied territory. They do not concern themselves with the well-being of the inhabitants. These are the concerns that Ukraine grapples with, not Russia.
Following this line of thought, each additional month we allow Russia to remain in Ukraine presents them with an opportunity to further fortify their position, making victory increasingly challenging for us to attain. The expansion of defensive lines is a clear indication that Putin is content with maintaining a frozen frontline. This sentiment was echoed when he suggested the idea of negotiations during a recent interview.
I think he is ready, as long as we ready to give up everything he wants.
The Russians are gradually transitioning towards a fully defensive posture. While they may conduct attacks and feign advances, their primary objective is defensive rather than expansionary. If opportunities arise where territories come under their control, they will gladly accept them, but such acquisitions, in my view, are additional benefits rather than core objectives.
Russia completed its southern lines of defense nearly a year ago. Now, they have extended these defensive lines to the southeast. If given another nine months, they will likely expand the line all the way to Bakhmut city. This development directly stems from the Western world’s failure to understand the battlefield conditions and appropriately respond.
For Russia, they are both the ones fighting and making decisions. Putin does not care how he wins, as long as he wins. As evidence, the Russian army has recruited 15,000 individuals from Nepal.
According a recent CNN report 15,000 Nepali men have joined the Russian military, “after the Russian government last year announced a lucrative package for foreign fighters to join the country’s military.
The package included at least $2,000 salary a month and a fast-tracked process to obtain a Russian passport. Nepal’s passport is ranked one of the worst in the world for global mobility, below North Korea, according to an index created by global citizenship and residence advisory firm Henley & Partners, and the Himalayan nation is among the world’s poorest, with a per capita GDP of $1,336 for 2022, according to World Bank data”.
Last September, the Time reported that the Russian army is recruiting men from Cuba to fight in Ukraine.
Posts advertising a “contract with the Ministry of Defense for military service in the Russian army” began to appear on Cuban Facebook groups in June. Recruits were offered a monthly salary of 204,000 rubles, or $2,086 U.S. dollars — an almost unimaginable sum in Cuba, where the average salary is less than $50 per month. On Sept. 5, a Ukrainian hacker group posted what appeared to be a version of the six-page contract that recruits signed once they arrived in Russia, translated into flawless Spanish. It required a one-year commitment and came with benefits that included a one-time enlistment fee of 195,000 rubles (roughly $2,000) and 2 million rubles (roughly $21,000) for their families if they are killed.
The Russian army is actively recruiting individuals from around the world. With a monthly salary of $2,000, many unemployed and financially struggling men may opt to join the Russian military without fully understanding the implications. Putin is determined not to let the West defeat him, and he is employing every available strategy to secure victory.
Given the state of the Russian economy, the decision to recruit from overseas for military service makes sense. It helps alleviate the strain on the domestic workforce by reducing the number of men drawn away from it.
On our side, Ukraine bears the brunt of the fighting, while the West determines what support to provide and what to withhold. This discrepancy creates a problem as the support may not always align with what the fighters deem necessary for the battlefield. This issue won’t be easily resolved.
Ukraine must secure victory in the war this year. Relying on the Russian economy to collapse as a strategy to achieve victory is unlikely to succeed. While there’s a slim chance it might, it’s not worth risking the lives of millions of Ukrainians on such uncertain odds. It’s imperative to take matters into our own hands and actively pursue victory through other means.
Ukraine needs to attain air superiority to break through the Russian defense.
Of course, there are multiple strategies to achieve victory. Ukraine could opt to breach the Russian defensive lines in one or two key sections, advance, and disrupt the Russian defense by instigating explosive chaos. However, before reaching that stage, securing air superiority will greatly enhance their capabilities.
It will enable the Ukrainian army to target and destroy Russian military assets in the rear. For instance, if they manage to neutralize ammunition depots and create shortages at the frontline, even for a few days, it could lead to breakthroughs in certain areas. Therefore, I am not entirely discounting the prospects of victory solely because Russians are reinforcing their defensive positions every 12 months.
They will undoubtedly make things challenging for Ukraine. Anticipating anything less from them would be a mistake.
