Russians Open a New Front in the North
Kremlin wants to stretch the Ukrainian troops to facilitate their attacks near Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka
The Russians knew that the Ukrainians were aware. For months, top officials in the Zelensky administration had been warning that the Russians would attempt to open a new front in the north and attack Kharkhiv city.
President Zelensky’s Chief of Staff, Andriy Yermak, told Politico in April that Russia is likely to make a big push on Kharkiv in May or June.
“We know that Putin is preparing a new wave of mobilization and we reckon new counter-offensive operations by the Russians could start at the end of the May or the beginning of June. Of course, we have to be ready for this,” Andriy Yermak said. “We still critically need additional air-defense systems because without them it is impossible to for us to defend our cities,” he added.
The timing was off by two weeks: Ukraine had expected the Russians to do this by the end of the month. Under pressure to act before Ukraine’s combat power could be bolstered by the influx of American weapons, the Russian army entered Ukraine through the north.
The Institute for the Study of War, in its report on the offensive operation by the Russian army, stated that the Russians had made “tactically significant gains” in the “initial phase” of the operation.
Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Butusov and Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported that Russian forces seized Strilecha, Krasne, Pylna, and Borisivka (all north to northeast of Lyptsi), and Butusov reported that Russian forces have established a foothold in the area five kilometers deep and 10 kilometers wide.
The Russians took control of several villages near the border.
ISW assesses with high confidence, based on credible Ukrainian reporting and the preponderance of evidence, that Russian forces have seized Strilecha, Krasne, and Borisivka, but has yet to observe geolocated confirmation of this assessment.
I would like to draw your attention to the Kherson/Dnipro operation conducted by Ukraine, which is still underway. What Ukraine did in this sector is very similar to what Russians are trying to do in the north.
Sometime around the middle of last year, Ukrainian troops crossed the Dnipro River and began attacking the Russian troops on the other side. For almost six months, Russian troops have been attempting to evict the Ukrainians from the left bank of the river. However, due to the nature of the terrain and a lack of sufficient manpower and capacity, the Russians have still not been able to remove the Ukrainian troops from the location.
The region features extensive wetlands and marshes, particularly in the areas surrounding the Dnipro River, where most of the Ukrainian operations are focused.
But Ukraine achieved its limited objective in the area, which was to draw Russian combat power to an undefended area. From having barely any troops in the Kherson sector, today the Russians have multiple brigades in the sector.
The southern most tip of the theatre continues to be a pain in the backside for the Russian army. They cannot ignore the presence of Ukrainian troops in the sector because one fine day they might very well decide to increase their deployments and mount a strong assault towards Crimea from here. But at the same time, the location of the bridgehead established by the Ukrainians is so far deep in the south that the Russians do not have sufficient resources to be diverted from other parts of the frontline to fully evict the Ukrainian troops from this region.
As a result, Russia took the middle ground: they redeployed some of the reconstituted brigades to the sector, stationed them there permanently, and blocked the Ukrainians from moving further deep into the occupied territory.
A new front was created in mid-2023, and it remains highly active.
Ukraine wanted to force the Russians to defend a previously undefended area, and they succeeded. However, the beachhead did not turn into a hugehead. It stretched the Russian forces, but Russia did not suffer significant problems because they kept mobilizing throughout the year. Every year, the strength of the Russian troop continues to increase, from less than 200,000 in February 2022 to around 350,000 in 2023, and they are now inching closer to half a million.
The additional capacity that the Russians brought to the occupied territory helped alleviate the stress of being stretched thin. In the north, Russia is creating the same kind of problem that Ukraine had created for them in the south. Ukraine needs to address the problem with the same solution that the Russians had implemented.
The area where the Russians have entered in the north is a gray zone. Neither Ukraine nor Russia had a huge number of troops in this sector, and there are not enough defensive fortifications. These are just open lands.
How many times has the Freedom of Russia legion (partisans) crossed into the Russian border, attacked Russian troops on the other side, made a huge news splash, and then vanished again?
Russia will never be able to stop such attacks because there is simply way too much area to defend and way too few resources to expend. Ukraine will face the same problem if Russia starts to attack from the north. They will have to find troops from somewhere to stop the Russians from advancing. A few hundred Russian troops can show up somewhere, and Ukraine will have no choice but to respond, as advancing on this open terrain is far easier than responding.
But unlike the Kherson sector, the open terrain where the Russians are advancing in the north is going to leave them brutally exposed. Advancing tens of kilometers into Ukrainian territory will be far easier than holding those settlements for ten days. The cost Russia has to pay will be huge. However, I firmly believe that the Russians are going to be more than happy to pay this cost.
The Russian armed forces will most probably won’t commit a lot of tanks and armored vehicles to this new front, but they will be absolutely happy to send hundreds of Russian soldiers into the sector, despite being fully aware that for most of them it will be their final overland trip.
These are going to be infantry-heavy assaults.
The idea is to force Ukraine to respond, draw Ukrainian troops into defending a huge amount of previously undefended area, stretch the Ukrainian troops, reduce the density of Ukrainian combat capacity at the frontline, and keep pushing further into the Avdiivka and Bakhmut (chasiv yar) sectors.
I think this is a huge mistake by the Russian forces
The Russians have made a few operationally sound decisions this year. Their decision to go on the offensive before American aid gets fully distributed to Ukrainian troops, the decision to compensate for the rapidly shrinking armored vehicle stockpile by increasing manpower, and the decision to keep the Ukrainian air-defense under stress by attacking deep inside Ukrainian territory were all tactically sound decisions they made this year.
But the new front in the northern sector, after the American aid was cleared in mid-April, poses far too much risk for the Russians to bear. They are underestimating the Ukrainians once again. The morale scale is not as low as it was in February this year. That was a time of darkness, as they were running short of everything. They had no clue if the United States would ever supply them. They were short on air-defense missiles, artillery shells, and everything else required for the war.
That is not where they are now. They are still short, but they are fully aware that weapons are coming. They are also aware that the 22-plus recruitment centers they opened around the country this year are going to slowly close the gaps. On top of this, there was no surprise element to the Russian attack.
Ukraine knew where the Russians were going to open a new front and when.
They would be prepared.
They are prepared.
This does not mean that they are not going to lose some border areas to the Russian troops. But I don’t think they should care. Not right now. The Russians are trying a little bit too much.
Instead of worrying about the territory they are going to give up, they should be looking at the infantry-heavy assaults and telling themselves, ‘Well, Russians are already losing around 1,000 soldiers for their defense and offense of the 600-mile frontline. Now they are adding another few hundred miles, so let us take the manpower cost closer to 1,500 soldiers every day.’
Ukraine will lose territory, and a few villages will move back and forth between the two sides. But the cost Russia is going to pay for this will be huge. I do not see the Russians advancing to Kharkiv city or getting anywhere closer to it.
As long as the Russians limit these attacks to limited objectives, I don’t see that as a huge problem for both sides to create a new status quo in the north and settle down with it. If the Russians step up, Ukraine will lose territory for a brief period, extracting a ginormous manpower cost on the Russians — something they better avoid, because Ukraine’s combat power, which started to increase since mid-April, will continue to rise over the next several months.
The Kremlin has underestimated the Ukrainians, and every time they did that, we know where it went.
The Russian offensive in northern Ukraine is a risky gamble. While it might achieve limited tactical objectives, the long-term benefits for Russia are questionable. Increased casualties and stretched resources could further hinder their overall war effort.
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