Russia’s 452,000 Soldiers: Where are they?
Kremlin’s Growing Military Dilemma
I used to like Wagner Mercenary Chief Yevgeny Prigozhin. Not because he was a murderous thug, but every now and then, he would purposely allow the true status of the Russian military to slip out into the open. But the poor man died as he and his friends had a grenade party go wrong in their private jet. The Kremlin’s official stance is that drugs and grenades are to be blamed for Prigozhin’s death. No one else.
After Prigozhin’s death, I was left in the dark. There wasn’t any interview from the Russian end that I could sit and watch with my ‘find the truth’ mode on. But I kept looking and finally landed on Igor Girkin, the man who headed Kremlin’s separatist operations in the Donbas region.
Igor Girkin was found guilty by The Hague District Court for causing the MH17 crash above the Ukrainian region of Donetsk in 2014, killing all 298 on board.
The plane was struck by what the Dutch court established was a missile supplied by Moscow and broke up mid-air, scattering wreckage and bodies over farmland and fields of sunflowers in the Ukrainian region of Donetsk. The missile launcher is said to have come from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, a unit of the Russian armed forces based in the Russian city of Kursk and was driven back there after MH17 was shot down.
Girkin was not a regular Russian citizen. He was well-connected. He was well-protected. But the equation changed after Girkin started to criticize Putin’s actions in Ukraine. He called him out and Putin responded by locking him up. Girkin continues to speak from jail. Every now and then, just like Prigozhin did, he will let a few operational details slip. But there was something he said this week that caught my eye.
In a letter published on January 11th, Girkin says that “Russia currently has “no plans” for a broad offensive in Ukraine and that Russia’s war in Ukraine is developing according to a “very bad” scenario”.
ISW: “Girkin claimed that most of the reported 452,000 servicemen who enrolled in the Russian military in 2023 are already serving in Ukraine or “will not get there at all,” meaning that without a new wave of mobilization in spring 2024, Russia will not have the manpower required to conduct operationally significant offensive operations later this year”.
The 452,000
That number forced itself into mainstream discussion after “Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on November 9th that the Russian military has recruited 410,000 contract, volunteer, and conscripted military personnel since January 1, 2023, then later claimed on December 1 that the Russian military recruited over 452,000 personnel since January 1, 2023”.
The numbers announced by Russia were extremely closer to the 420,000 estimates given by Vadym Skibytskyi, an official from Ukraine’s military spy agency in September last year. It was really weird to have both the Russian military and Ukrainian military produce assessments that converged at the same point. But that is where it was.
It is entirely possible that the Russian army’s strength in occupied Ukrainian territory is in the vicinity of half a million. Not all of them will be soldiers fighting in the frontline as military operations will have a lot of support functions that aid the military activities. The number feels like a whole lot, but that is also because this is probably the first time we are discussing the total personnel strength of the Russian military in occupied Ukraine.
I think these assessments are very close to reality. This is the point where Girkin’s statement breathes itself into a different life.
He said most of the reported 452,000 servicemen who enrolled in the Russian military in 2023 are already serving in Ukraine or “will not get there at all.”
The Kremlin says they recruited 410,000 personnel last year. It is not far-fetched to assume that most of these recruits are already in Ukraine. Russia is the one that is attacking the frontline since October this year. The entire western media has agreed on one thing, that the war is in a stalemate. The one who attacks will lose more than the one who defends.
The Ukrainian frontline is in such a shape that mechanized assaults almost always end up in disaster. You have to rely on infantry assaults to break in. The rate of infantry losses for the attacker will be extremely high.
Now, let us bring in ISW’s take on Girkin’s statement:
without a new wave of mobilization in spring 2024, Russia will not have the manpower required to conduct operationally significant offensive operations later this year.
I honestly do not have any idea of how the battlefield will shape up in Spring 2024. Russia, as Girkin argues, may very well be short of manpower to conduct offensive operations. But it is also possible that Ukraine does not have enough weapons and ammunition needed to deliver a clear breakthrough.
But there is one thing that I can clearly see. If, as Girkin says, most of the half a million recruits are already there in Ukraine, which I believe is true, then Russia will have to recruit the same number of men next year. Most probably, the requirement for 2024 will be a lot higher than the number recruited in 2023.
The standard of recruits will always progressively go down when a country is at war. At the start, you are bringing in healthy adults who are willing to fight. Then you start relaxing the rules to bring in more recruits. Then you keep relaxing so that you can find people to fight. There is exactly a near zero percent chance for next year’s available pool of recruits to be better than last year.
What this means: the rate at which these new recruits fail at the frontline will increase. This means you will have to recruit more soldiers next year to regenerate last year’s capacity.
According to a Reuters report published on December 24th, 2023: Russia was short of around 4.8 million workers in 2023, and the problem will remain acute in 2024. Russia may or may not be able to conduct offensive operations in Spring 2024. But if they recruit half a million soldiers. If they remove half a million workers from their economy that is already short of 5 million workers, there is no way they will be able to contain inflation.
They can raise the interest rates all the way to 40%, but it will do nothing to reduce inflation. Since April 2023, inflation has increased every month.
Every single month.
Egg prices in Russia have risen so fast that the Kremlin is telling the Russians that this has nothing to do with inflation but because Russians are now richer than ever.
“Our [egg] production didn’t fall, but the demand has grown and we weren’t able to adjust in time. As people’s incomes have increased slightly, they began purchasing more eggs and chicken meat, driving up prices,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a meeting with entrepreneurs in the Far East.
My read on the developing situation:
- Putin has no choice but to recruit more workers next year to stay in the war. (More than 452,000)
- If he does, it will exacerbate Russia’s economic woes.
- The Russian war machine can only run by shaking the state for its pennies.
- The Russian economy may very well defeat the Russian army in 2024.
Ukraine’s Core Problems are Fixable. Russia’s Core Problems are Not
Ukraine should have been at the Azov sea by now. Had the United States supplied hundreds of Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), instead of 20 units, Ukraine would have obliterated the Russian airfields in the occupied territory.
During a press conference with journalists in Latvia on Thursday, the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukrainian forces destroyed 26 Russian helicopters in a single day: “Partners have provided us with some long-range weapons, with it, we destroyed 26 helicopters in a day, and 12 planes that took off and attacked with missiles, against which these systems were working”.
Do take a second to note the word “some”, in President Zelensky’s statement. The NYTimes report that said the United States supplied 20 ATACAMS missiles to Ukraine is most probably true.
What a freaking shame!
He did not name the weapon. But it was obvious. President Zelensky was talking about the ATACMS units which they used to hit Russian airfields in October last year.
Initial estimates kept the Russian loss at Berdiansk and Luhansk airfields at 21 helicopters. Both the Russians as well as Ukrainians kept their mouths shut, so we did not know the full impact, until Ukrainian President confirmed this week that Russia lost 26 helicopters.
Less than two dozen ATCAMS.
Imagine hundreds of these long-range missiles in Ukrainian hands. It would have completely changed the battlefield. That is probably the reason why the Biden administration continues to steadfastly refuse supplying anything to Ukraine that can put them on a direct path towards victory.
President Biden’s fear of a clear and decisive victory is stalling Ukraine’s progress. It gives Russian President Vladimir Putin the breathing space to try different options. And he keeps trying. And the one who tries… almost always… finds something to latch on.
North Korea is now supplying long-range missiles to Russia. Iran is getting ready to supply long-range missiles to Russia. But the United States will not supply long-range missiles to Ukraine.
31 M1 Abrams Tanks. 0 Fighter Jets. 20 ATCAMS missiles.
I guess… sometimes, the numbers do tell your state of mind.
