Russia’s Kursk Strategy is Doomed
Ukraine gets what it wants
On August 12, 2024, a week after Ukraine invaded Kursk, I highlighted a strategy for Ukraine: the option to double their Kursk footprint without doubling their Kursk capacity. I also identified a small settlement as the most crucial element of this strategy. Attached above is the image I posted in that article.
I concluded that if Ukraine executes this strategy, the Russians would have only one option.
The Russian army is now implementing the strategy outlined in the image above. They are attempting to breach the blue box shown in the image. For more details and a look at past events, you can read the article here: I picked one out of the many options Ukraine has in Kursk Oblast. It will change the battle on its head and the war.
In this article, let’s focus on what Russia is doing now, why they are doing it, and what Ukraine will do in response.
What are the Russians doing in Kursk?
I think we should refer to 2024 as the “Battle for the River Banks.” This term captures the Russians’ approach when they advanced at the Kharkiv front in May and mirrors the strategy the Ukrainians employed when they invaded Kursk in August.
That blue box you see above is the most important area in Kursk. Whoever controls the area around it will maintain control over the land south of the Seym River. The Russians have repeatedly attempted to build temporary bridges across the Seym river after Ukraine destroyed the existing ones. However, each time the Russians constructed a bridge, Ukraine promptly knocked it out.
One of the main advantages of staying closer to the Ukrainian border is that Ukraine can strike positions along the river using its artillery units stationed in its own territory. The distance is just 22 kilometers. Ukraine’s homemade artillery gun 2S22 Bohdana has a range of 42 kms.
Russians are not going to succeed in building temporary bridges. I have no idea why they even bothered to send their engineering equipment to attempt it — it’s a waste of time and resources. The entire river will be under 24/7 Ukrainian drone surveillance. It will only be a matter of hours before Ukraine detects any new bridge and destroys it promptly.
After realizing the option to build a temprory bridge does not exist, the Russians finally realised the imporance of Krasnooktyabr’skoe village.
Refer to what I wrote on August 12:
The Ukrainian armed forces are still advancing at such a fast pace that map makers covering the war effort are struggling to track their progress. Recent reports indicate that Ukraine has reached Krasnooktyabr’skoe village, which lies on the banks of the Reka Seym River. This is a very important location because it is where the river turns.
Ukraine advanced into Kursk at such a rapid pace that they reached this critical settlement just ten days after their invasion began. Ideally, on the third day of Ukraine’s Kursk invasion, the Russian army should have airlifted some of its troops and dropped them near this village. Granted, they were in a panic and missed the opportunity, but they could have done it at least after Ukraine entered the village on August 12.
They didn’t.
Even in the last week of August, after relocating their troops from Kaliningrad to Kursk, they still did nothing. Instead, Putin seemed to downplay the significance of Kursk, focusing on watching Roman Khadyrov’s son demonstrate his bravery at a shooting range.
Almost a month later, the Russians are trying to take back this small settlement.
The Russians have now entered the village, leading to a significant battle between Russian and Ukrainian forces. The unfortunate part is that the town no longer holds as much strategic value as it did a month ago.
Ouch!
How did this happen?
Because Ukraine didn’t just sit idle after taking over the settlement. They also seized control of areas to the north and south of the village.
If the Russians manage to retake Krasnooktyabr’skoe village, it still won’t grant them access to the land south of the Seym River. They would need to advance all the way to Komarovka village. Even that might not be sufficient. They need to push beyond Komarovka and break through the Ukrainian defenses along the entire section, as shown in the image below.
Russia needs to take control of the red section. Let’s assume the Russians somehow manage to do that — how long will they be able to hold it? How many troops will they need to commit to pushing the Ukrainians back in that area, and how many more will be required to secure their position?
Even if they somehow manage to insert themselves between the Seym River and Ukrainian troops in Kursk, how will they hold it? They can’t. There’s a reason why this is an almost impossible task.
If Russia somehow takes control of the red section, here’s what I would do: I would order Ukrainian troops to advance from the west.
In that scenario, the Russian troops will have the Seym River at their backs, Ukrainian forces on their left and right, and a narrow supply route. It will become one of the most dangerous kill zones on the entire Ukrainian battlefield.
This approach is not going to work.
I agree that a strong counterattack to take control of Krasnooktyabr’skoe village might have been effective at one time. That opportunity passed in mid-August, and Russia no longer has that option. Ukraine is luring the Russians into a trap by keeping its troops stationed outside Kursk. By deliberately leaving the land south of the Seym River open, Ukraine is taunting the Russian forces.
This is a seriously flawed move by the Russians. Even if they manage to fully control Krasnooktyabr’skoe village and nearby settlements, it will have little impact on the final outcome. Ukraine could even withdraw from the town and allow the Russians to take it. I would suggest Ukraine do just that. Let them take the settlement.
The Russian army’s strategy is effectively one month behind.
Thanks for reading. Making critical information on Ukraine accessible is one way to fight misinformation. That’s why I’ve made 275 stories free to the public in 2024, including this one.
