Target Russia’s Strength or Weakness?
Why Ukraine is going after both?
As a strategist, do you lean towards targeting your enemy’s weaknesses, or do you opt for confronting their strengths? This is a question that consistently perplexes me. Some days, I find myself swaying towards one approach, and on other days, I lean towards the opposite, never settling on a definitive solution to this dilemma.
Observing Ukraine, I am inclined towards adopting a middle-ground strategy. It’s not about seeking a perfect balance, but rather about maintaining remarkable flexibility. If you were to pose the question to Ukraine, asking, What will you target — Russia’s weakness or Russia’s strength? their likely response would be: It depends.
It depends on a lot of factors.
Russia’s strength isn’t in their manpower, oil and gas industry, defense industrial production capacity, population under siege, supportive allies, or their ability to endure hardship. Their biggest strength is the Western fear to hand them a full defeat.
The fear of provoking Putin.
The White House has significantly constrained Ukraine’s reaction to Russian assaults. The Kremlin received the message loud and clear — Ukraine wouldn’t be permitted to employ Western weaponry for attacks within Russian borders. The situation reached a point where Ukraine lacked the means to strike at Russian assets even within its own territory.
Yes.
Mariupol is a Ukrainian city. Located about 80 kms from the frontline. Ukraine did not have the weapons to attack Russian military occupying their own territory. Such a situation prompted Washington Post Columnist Max Boot to write an article with the title, “ Give Ukraine the ability to strike every inch of Russian occupied territory.” He wrote this on December 13th, 2022. Almost seven months after Russia invaded Ukraine.
It was only in May 2023, when Britain provided them with Storm Shadow missiles, that Ukraine gained the capability to bring the entire occupied territory within firing range.
Last year, Ukraine had drawn up large plans to take the attack directly inside Russia.
In February, with the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine days away, officials in Kyiv were busy making plans to attack Moscow.Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the country’s military intelligence directorate, the HUR, instructed one of his officers “to get ready for mass strikes on 24 February … with everything the HUR had”
On Feb. 22, two days before the anniversary, the CIA circulated a new classified report: The HUR “had agreed, at Washington’s request, to postpone strikes” on Moscow. But they offer a specific example of a broader tension that has characterized much of the war: Ukraine, eager to bring the fight to Russia’s home turf, is sometimes restrained by the United States, which has tried to avoid escalating the conflict into a direct fight between U.S. and Russian forces. Some U.S. officials see attacks on Russia, particularly if they involve U.S.-supplied weapons, as highly risky operations that Russian President Vladimir Putin could find so threatening that he resorts to using tactical nuclear weapons.
The Washington Post, which reported the story, did not delve into the potential targets. However, given Ukraine’s likely approach, it probably involved military or economic assets of the Kremlin, or structures intended to convey a direct message to the Kremlin.
The Kremlin perceives a sense of security in certain aspects. Consequently, they haven’t truly invested in safeguarding their economic assets within Russia. Even if they did attempt to do so, it would pose an immensely challenging task due to Russia’s vast size and numerous assets scattered across the country. This vulnerability transformed into a considerable strength, primarily because the White House hindered any Ukrainian initiatives to launch attacks within Russia.
If this was the White House’s desire — for Ukraine not to launch attacks inside Russia — they should have counterbalanced it by equipping Ukraine with everything necessary to neutralize Russian military assets within Ukraine. However, this was not the case. The limitations imposed by the White House on Ukraine occasionally make me question whether they genuinely aim to see Ukraine emerge victorious in the war against Russia.
It does seem like they might be attempting to prolong the war, anticipating that Putin will eventually find it overwhelming and be compelled to come to the negotiation table. Yet, even in pursuing this objective, the White House has lagged behind. The President, during his visit to Kyiv, initially declared unwavering support for Ukraine “as long as it takes.” However, that commitment was revised a few months ago to “as long as we can.”
As the United States gradually retreated from the forefront, the constraints they placed around Ukraine have begun to dissipate. In the last two weeks, Ukraine has significantly intensified its attacks inside Russia.
January 18, 2024 to January 28, 2024:
- “A Russian appointed official said on Jan. 18 that Ukraine had tried and failed to target a Russian Baltic Sea oil terminal with a drone. Ukraine said it had hit targets in St Petersburg with domestic-made drone. Mikhail Skigin, a co-owner of the St Petersburg Oil Terminal, told RBC media that the air defence had thwarted a “monstrous catastrophe”, which could lead to human losses and ecological damage to the Baltic Sea.
- Four oil tanks at a large storage facility in the town of Klintsy in Russia’s western Bryansk region caught fire on Jan. 19 after the military brought down a Ukrainian strike drone, the regional governor said. A spokesperson for Ukraine’s military intelligence agency neither confirmed nor denied Ukraine’s involvement.
- A fire tore through Ryazan oil refinery, Russia’s third-largest, on Jan 19, the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper said, quoting emergency services.
- Russian energy giant Novatek, opens new tab on Jan. 21 was forced to suspend some operations at the huge Baltic Sea fuel export terminal at Ust-luga as well as “technological processes” at a nearby fuel-producing complex due to a fire, started by what Ukrainian media said was a drone attack.
- Russia will likely cut exports of naphtha by some 127,500–136,000 barrels per day, or around a third of its total exports, after fires disrupted operations at refineries on the Baltic and Black Seas, according to traders and LSEG ship-tracking data.
- Rosneft’s, Tuapse oil refinery in southern Russia halted oil processing and output on Jan. 26 following a fire, two industry sources familiar with the matter told Reuters. A Ukrainian source said Ukrainian drones attacked the refinery on the shores of the Black Sea.
- Russia’s second-largest oil producer Lukoil, has halted a unit at NORSI, Russia’s fourth largest refinery, located near the city of Nizhny Novgorod, some 430 km (270 miles) east of Moscow, after an “incident”.
- Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said on Jan. 27 that repair work would take at least a month or a month and a half. Russian air defences thwarted a drone attack on Jan. 29 on the Slavneft-YANOS oil refinery in the city of Yaroslavl, northeast of Moscow, regional governor Mikhail Yevrayev said”.
The White House’s fear of escalation stands as Russia’s major advantage. At its core is the hesitancy to take the offensive against Russia. Over the past four weeks, Ukraine has aggressively tackled this issue, all while abstaining from the use of Western weaponry. In the face of a potential tactical nuclear response, it is Ukraine that would bear the cost with their blood. Nevertheless, they persist in refusing to let fear dictate their actions —that is how you win the war.
As President Franklin D. Roosevelt said in 1933,
“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”
Ukraine’s escalating attacks on the Oil and gas industry will not shut the industry down and push Russia into a corner. But what it will do is: it will increase the cost of Russian oil production. Supply interruptions will complicate a lot of things for the Kremlin, while reducing the amount of money the industry brings to the Kremlin’s table.
Russia cannot sustain absorbing repeated blows. Consequently, they will need to relocate some of their air-defense assets to safeguard strategic locations within Russia. This shift will render those assets unavailable for Russian operations within Ukraine.
Ukraine is straining Russian resources. If Russia drops a tactical weapon on Ukraine, NATO can destroy the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet with conventional weapons. The White House will never call Putin’s nuclear bluff.
Ukraine has already called it.
