The Kremlin needs a mobilization order, but Putin won’t issue one.

The balance of combat power between Ukraine and Russia is beginning to shift.

Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Chief Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov said yesterday that the “Russian military is experiencing personnel shortages and a decrease in the number of new volunteers signing contracts”.

Budanov added that “mounting issues will force Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a critical decision: either launch another risky and controversial mobilization or reduce the intensity of combat operations in Ukraine”.

For nearly two years, Putin has carefully avoided issuing a full mobilization order. Stung by the furious response of nearly a million Russians who packed their bags and fled to other countries after he ordered partial mobilization in September 2022, Putin has since refused to mobilize the entire Russian population to support his war efforts. Instead, the Kremlin and the Russian armed forces have adopted a two-pronged strategy for military recruitment: inducement and coercion.

To entice Russian men, Putin has repeatedly increased one-time payments and annual salaries for new recruits. The current one-time payment at the time of enlistment stands at a staggering $11,000. Anyone struggling economically would certainly be tempted to take that signing bonus. However, only those willing to overlook the risks of never getting the chance to spend that money will sign on the dotted line. The smart ones are likely to stay out of it.

On the other hand, the entire Russian system quietly works in the background, identifying specific ethnic groups within Russia and forcing them into military service.

For two years, these two strategies have ensured that the Russian military has not run out of manpower in the field. However, due to the economic challenges Russia is facing, Putin has run out of options to further bolster his inducement strategy.

If 1,200 soldiers become casualties every day, Putin needs to recruit 1,200 soldiers daily. That amounts to a daily baseline recruitment (one-time) expenditure of $13 million.

$13 million multiplied by 30 is $396 million per month.

Gazprom is finished. The Kremlin is now fully dependent on daily oil sales. The Central Bank chief has already informed the Kremlin that there is little room to raise interest rates, and dipping into cash reserves will only fuel the already soaring inflation. Putin cannot touch the savings. His oil revenue isn’t increasing, and he cannot raise military wages. The inducement strategy has reached a dead end.

This leaves coercive, “crypto mobilization” as the only option. Putin needs to recruit at least 40,000 soldiers every month to sustain operations in Ukraine.

How long can he keep this up? No more than a year, says Budanov.

Budanov noted that Russia anticipates a worsening economic and socio-political situation by mid-2025

There is much the West can do to shorten that timeline. They can either help Ukraine destroy Russia’s combat power in the occupied territories or drain Russia’s oil revenue.

According to CREA, “In February, 45% of Russian oil and its products were transported by tankers subject to the oil price cap. The remainder was shipped by ‘shadow’ tankers and was not subject to the price cap policy. Almost two-thirds of Russian crude shipped in February was done via ‘shadow’ tankers with tankers owned or insured in countries implementing the price cap transporting 35% of the total”.

Less than half of Russian oil is sold at the $60 price cap imposed by the West. The United States and Europe are fully aware of where the rest of the oil is being sold and how it’s being transported, yet they have made little effort to fully enforce the sanctions.

Since Putin is flouting sanctions, why not reduce the price cap further and increase enforcment? How about siezing 1 tanker from the shadow fleet every month?

I doubt that the western world will change its approach on economic sanctions, which is why I agree with Budanov’s assessment that Putin won’t begin to feel the effects of an acute manpower shortage until 2025.

For a long time, Ukraine was the one facing manpower challenges. Many Putin sympathizers in the West pointed to Russia’s vast manpower as a reason for appeasement. That situation is now beginning to reverse. Ukraine has initiated mobilization and possesses Western-supplied weapons that prioritize the safety of their crews — unlike Russian systems, which are built with little regard for the lives of their operators.

• Russia has already lost its edge in heavy weaponry and is running short on tanks. “A compilation of data from various sources suggests Ukraine currently has roughly 1,500 active tanks compared with around 1,400 for Russia, Bloomberg reported”.
• They are also lagging in mobility, as they fail to produce enough armored personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles. Russians now regularly resort to using motorcycles to storm the front lines, making them the first professional army in the world to do so during a modern war.
• Now, Russia is beginning to lose its mass infantry advantage as well.

They would have also lost their artillery advantage if North Korea hadn’t stepped in to fill the gap. Just as Ukraine begins to reduce its reliance on Western arms, Russia has become heavily dependent on Iran and North Korea for its weapons supply.

Ukraine is no longer the underdog.

The roles have started to reverse.

I almost forget to add this one. Since the day Putin invaded, Ukraine needed western support to stay alive. Putin’s Russia has now joined the list. They cannot survive without western assistance.

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