There’s nothing that provokes Ukraine more than weakness.
Ukraine does to Putin, what he does to everyone.
A few hours ago, or God knows when, Ukraine quietly doubled its force density in the Kursk direction. They moved the following units to the front: the 130th Recon Battalion, the 61st Mechanized Brigade, the 225th Assault Battalion, and the 116th Mechanized Brigade, which also operates a dedicated drone unit called the Khorne Group.
You can check the story I wrote yesterday. At that time, Ukraine only had the 80th Air Assault Brigade, the 22nd Mechanized Brigade, the 88th Mechanized Brigade, the 54th Recon Battalion, and a drone group.
Now, they have all of the above plus additional units. If Ukraine maintains its traditional numbers, Ukraine’s northern grouping must be around 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers. There are also reserves on standby.
The additional strength that Ukraine has brought to bear in this sector puts more aces in their hand. They are challenging the Russians with maneuver warfare (fast and lethal) and doing so in an area where Russia has no established defenses.
Many years ago, Senator John McCain said this about Putin:
There’s nothing that provokes Vladimir Putin more than weakness.
There’s nothing that provokes Ukraine more than weakness.
More than 100 hours have passed since Ukrainian forces crossed the border, and Russian forces have yet to mobilize. They had no contingency plans and simply assumed that, due to U.S. restrictions on attacks on Russian territory, Ukraine would never dare to cross the border on such a scale. They were overconfident, believing that Ukraine’s combat power was not yet at a level where it could afford to take such risks.
Mistake after mistake after mistake.
But that’s all right. Mistakes do happen, but they need to be corrected. The only option available for Russia is to find a way to engage the Ukrainians in Kursk Oblast. There is no alternative.
- Why haven’t they done it yet?
- Why are they hesitating to pull troops from the northeast and send them to Kursk Oblast?
- What about redeploying troops from the Avdiivka sector? Or the Dnipro grouping? Forget that — why not send the elite 83rd Air Assault Brigade or the elite 155th Naval Brigade?
Oh, I forgot. Ukraine decimated the 83rd Airborne in Vochansk (Kharkiv direction), and the Russians made a mess of the 155th by repeatedly slamming them against Vuhledar (near Avdivvka).
All the Russian elite units are hurt and operating well below their potential capacity. So, they can’t pull them out because there is not much left to pull from. To make matters worse, Russia is using infantry-heavy attacks against Ukraine on the older front. This works there because those are established lines with supply chains set up to support the troops and equipment.
Russia has nothing of the sort in Kursk Oblast. They are running extremely low on tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers. So, when Ukraine challenged them with maneuver warfare, deftly mixing their troops to take full advantage of combined arms, the Russian army has no clue how to respond.
What will I do if I were to advice the Kremlin under these circumstances?
There is only one way out. I will stop sending heavy weapons to the older frontline and redirect whatever I have to Kursk. I will withdraw all my remaining elite units and deploy them to halt the Ukranian advance. I will not repeat the infantry-heavy attacks in Kursk, because given Ukraine’s reconnaissance capabilities and firepower in the sector, infantry units are likely to be decimated before they even reach the frontlines.
I need artillery units, highly mobile units, and well-trained soldiers. I will start with small sections and attempt to draw Ukrainian units towards me. I will ensure a connection to a supply route, stop the Ukrainian advance in one area, and then try to replicate this success across the entire Kursk region.
However, there is one problem: if Russia takes this approach, Ukraine will likely respond by sitting back and declaring, “Job done.”
There seems to be only one way the Russian army can respond to this. Unfortunately for them, this is exactly what Ukraine wants. This is the main reason I have mentioned more than once that the aces are in Ukraine’s hand.
Ukraine’s main objective in Kursk Oblast is to draw Russian troops — nothing more. There are several additional benefits, including political, propaganda, and morale gains, but these are merely supplementary.
Why would Russia not chose to press even harder in the older frontline?
Where are they going to find the troops? They don’t have any. The slow reaction from the Kremlin has brutally exposed this vulnerability. They are running low on reserves. It was Russia’s daily recruitment capacity that allowed them to send wave after wave of attacks against Ukraine. They had the numbers, and it was effective in one sector.
But I do expect the Russian army to try this with whatever reserves they have. It will be risky. But they are highly likely to go down this path.
What will Ukraine do now?
So far, they haven’t overplayed their hand. They are skillfully using the terrain to their advantage and are still holding areas they can defend. They achieved operational surprise, which is the primary reason they control more than 300 square kilometers of Russian territory.
Russia has no defenses in Kursk, whatsoever. Had Ukraine wanted to, they could have driven their fast-moving fighting vehicles all the way to Kursk City. Tanks are the slowest of heavy weapons; German-made Leopard tanks can travel at 42 km/h. So, how long will it take for a group of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and trucks carrying supplies to travel from the Ukrainian border to the city of Kursk?
In half a day, Ukraine could have reached the administrative borders of Kursk Oblast, but they didn’t. They shouldn’t. It makes no sense.
It does feel a bit like Ukraine is overplaying its hand, but so far, they haven’t. Things will change once Russia starts moving its troops to the front. That is inevitable, but it is a challenge for another day.
The Kremlin has exposed numerous weaknesses, and Ukraine is starting to capitalize on them. Ukraine needs to manage this sector day by day. They must make their move, then wait for Russia to respond, and then adjust accordingly. It’s almost like a game of chess: no need to think ten steps ahead, just focus on the next move, executed in the best possible manner.
That will suffice.
Thanks for reading. Making critical information on Ukraine accessible is one way to fight misinformation. That’s why I’ve made 226 stories free to the public in 2024, including this one.
