Why Ukraine Lost Ground Near Avdiivka
Pending two more weeks of struggle
My confidence in the timeline I suggested in the subtitle is somewhat lower than usual. There are numerous variables at play, and we need to examine each one individually.
We’ll start by assessing the highly active contact points on the frontline, the areas where Ukraine maintains its positions, the sectors where Russians are applying pressure, and analyze the situation from both Ukrainian and Russian perspectives. We’ll then evaluate whether Ukraine’s decisions are prudent or not and conclude with what we can anticipate over the next four to six weeks.
I would describe the frontline as highly active, comparable to the intensity witnessed in the first week of June 2023 when Ukraine launched its counter-attack along the entire line of contact. During that time, they initiated fire at more than twenty locations. While the Russians have not reached that level of intensity, there are certain spots on the frontline where their activity is particularly pronounced.
The focal point of their attack continues to be in the Avdiivka and Bakhmut sectors.
The incessant attacks on Kharkiv City and the significant troop buildup near Kupiansk, which serves as the gateway to Kharkiv, should have led to a high-intensity battle in the northeast by now. However, despite their efforts, the Russian forces have consistently failed to make significant progress in the sector. The defensive lines maintained by Ukraine in the northeast proves to be resilient, preventing the Russian forces from breaching it.
Then there’s southern Ukraine. Russia would have loved to evict the Ukranian troops holding the Robotyne bulge, expel Ukrainian forces from Vulhedar, and potentially gain ground around Velyka Novosilka. The Russian army is not able to do any of the above. This covers virtually the entire width of the contact line in southern Ukraine.
The Russians have persistently probed the entire frontline since the fall of Avdiivka in mid-February. While Ukraine’s northern and southern lines remain resilient, the mid-section around Avdiivka and Bakhmut appears to be a weak point in Ukrainian defenses. Gradually, Russia has made advances around Avdiivka, and after attempting various strategies, the Russian army has now chosen to increase its combat force density in this sector.
According to Dara Massicot, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “In the last ten days, Russian forces committed 3 critical brigade elements forward — the 74th, 35th, and 30th (from 41st CAA). These forces were used in final stages of the battle of Avdiivka and have been recovering for the last month.
These experienced brigade elements are supported by various DPR and reserve units. Concentrating them in the salient is indicative of the priority of this effort. Also, if Ukrainian forces can target them, they could degrade some of the most skilled brigades there”.
Russia has moved some of its best units to this sector. The Institute of Study of War reported on Ukrainian losses today:
Russian forces secured additional marginal tactical gains northwest and southwest of Avdiivka as of April 29, but have not made significant advances in the Avdiivka direction over the last 24 hours. Geolocated footage published on April 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western and northeastern Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka), along the rail line to the northwestern outskirts of Ocheretyne, and in Netaylove (southwest of Avdiivka)
Russian advances in the sector may appear marginal when viewed on a daily or weekly basis. However, the impact becomes apparent when comparing their current position to where they stood on February 1st.
Russians will persist in attacking around Bakhmut as capturing Chasiv Yar would further facilitate their advancement towards the administrative borders of Donetsk Oblast. (one push from Avdiivka and another one from Chasiv Yar). However, the attacks around Chasiv Yar have not yielded significant gains for them thus far.
The presence of the 74th, 35th, and 30th brigades in Avdiivka — brigades which Dara Massicot referred to as “experienced” — indicates that the Avdiivka sector will remain their primary focus.
What is Ukrainian Commander Syrskyi doing and where are the American weapons?
Ukraine faced two major challenges as they entered April 2024. Firstly, their supply chain was disrupted due to a shortage of weapons, particularly artillery shells. Secondly, they experienced a manpower shortage. However, on April 23rd, U.S. President Biden approved aid to Ukraine and pledged that the weapons would be delivered as quickly as possible.
Over the weekend, several videos surfaced on social media showing columns of military trucks travelling on the highways in Poland. These trucks are transporting weapons into Ukrainian warehouses, ultimately destined for the frontline. However, it’s important to note that the distribution of these weapons cannot happen over night.
It needs time.
On top of this, Ukraine had another challenge: Manpower shortage.
This was a mistake of their own making. President Zelensky’s failure to initiate mobilization last year and proactively address this gap was a significant error. However, on April 16th, he signed a law to begin addressing this issue.
The two critical problems facing Ukraine have been addressed. However, the resolution of these issues will not immediately translate into results on the frontline.
How long will it take?
I believe Ukraine will require at least two weeks to stabilize the frontline, particularly in the Avdiivka sector where the Russians have concentrated their forces.
Now, let’s consider this from Commander Syrskyi’s perspective. He is aware that American weapons are being unloaded into Ukrainian warehouses. He likely has detailed information on the daily recruitment of soldiers, the number completing training, and the anticipated deployment to the frontline over the next two weeks, next month, and the subsequent month. Moreover, he is likely well-informed about the timeline for the arrival of the 1 million plus artillery shells procured under the Czech-led initiative, which I expect to reach the frontline by June (in tranches).
If Commander Syrskyi has a combat capacity map, it would likely illustrate a trend of rapid growth in capability over the next few weeks, followed by stabilization at a particular level within two months.
Given these circumstances, I wouldn’t sacrifice additional lives to protect the land. Instead, I would prioritize saving lives, strategically retreating, and employing defensive tactics with greater depth. On April 4th, after looking at the frontline, I made the recommendation that Ukraine should not worry about retreating.
My April 4th recommendation:
The next eight weeks are going to be an extremely difficult period to negotiate. Russians are not going to stop until they exhaust their reserve strength. Ukraine is still short on material and manpower.
They need to dig deep into their mental fortitude to absorb the Russian hits.
Retreat if needed. Defend using depth.
Buy time.
I made that assessment before the United States decided to release aid to Ukraine. However, my assessment remains unchanged even after the aid was released, primarily due to the time factor I discussed earlier.
Now, let’s shift perspective and consider the situation from the Kremlin’s viewpoint. The Russians are aware that American convoys are still en route to Ukraine. They also understand that Ukraine is beginning to mobilize its forces. They probably know from where the Czechs have ordered the million-plus artillery shells, and when they will reach the frontline.
If I were on the Russian side, I would mobilize all available resources and press them to the frontline. I would push relentlessly until all reserves are exhausted because once Ukraine’s combat capacity returns to its previous strength, the options for the Russian forces become limited. Therefore, the strategy would be to advance as far as possible until further progress is untenable, and then swiftly transition to defensive positions once the frontline returns to a stalemate.
Indeed, it appears that the Russians are implementing the strategy described. Both sides seem to have a clear understanding of the current battlefield conditions and anticipate how they will evolve in the near future. Each side is acting in what they perceive to be their best interest given the circumstances. From this perspective, it seems that the Russians are not making a mistake; rather, they are pursuing what they believe to be their optimal course of action.
Ukraine’s approach also seems to be strategic given the current circumstances. While they have passed their lowest point, it’s important to recognize that improvement will not be immediate. It might not occur today, and perhaps not even until mid-May. However, their actions are likely the best option available to them at this time.
Things will improve gradually for Ukraine from this point onward. The first indication of progress will be when the Russians fail to advance during a given week. Ukraine must maintain a defensive position for some time without initiating major counter-attacks, even if their combat power surpasses that of the Russians. It’s crucial for Ukraine to exercise restraint and lie low for a period to consolidate their capacity gains and strengthen their hold on the frontline.
The initial priority should be to stabilize the frontlines, ensuring a secure position. Following this, efforts should focus on allowing the combat capacity to grow steadily, bolstering reserve capabilities as necessary. Once these foundational elements are in place, Ukraine can then consider and plan for the next steps in the conflict.
At least two weeks from here……
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