Ukraine Might be Struggling with Ammunition
Where are the 155 mm shells?
For nearly five weeks I have been reading western reports that said Ukraine is running short of ammunition and they are scaling back their counter-attacks in response. NYTimes. Washington Post. BBC. Bloomberg. You name it, they wrote about it.
The entire gang was singing the same chorus. I have heard their chorus before. I wasn’t ready to buy it. There was a burning desire to wait for evidence. A bit more concrete. What if Ukraine’s restrained actions were a strategic maneuver to conserve ammunition? Rather than squandering resources in a futile endeavor, perhaps they were meticulously amassing their arsenal for a decisive, coordinated offensive at a later stage.
Save now. Spend later.
I refused to buy the western media’s conclusion even when they quoted Ukrainian officials echoing the same sentiments. I wasn’t in denial. I wanted more evidence. While I remain cautious in drawing definitive conclusions, I am increasingly inclined to believe that Ukraine is facing a shortage of 155mm artillery shells.
What made me change my mind?
Because Ukraine has softened its bite and hold strategy in multiple sectors. You can read my explainer on Ukraine’s military strategy here: Russia’s ‘elastic defense’ has a structural weakness
It will be easier to explain the impact using pictures.
While most media outlets (including my own) were focused on the Robotyne axis during the latter half of last year, Ukraine was quietly making significant gains along the Piatykhatky axis, edging closer to the Surovikin line in the westernmost part of the Zaporizhzhia sector.
Take a look at the frontline images from Piatykhatky axis between October and January — Ukraine had made remarkable progress, advancing to within a stone’s throw of the Surovikin line, the final continuous Russian defensive fortification along that axis. Just a single mile stood between them and breaking through enemy lines.
Surprisingly, despite reaching this strategic position almost three months ago, Ukraine has not only halted its advance but has actually ceded some territory back to Russia. While the territorial loss is relatively insignificant, and Ukraine still maintains the capability to advance and break through the defensive line when the time is right, this decision to cede territory does not align with the conventional bite-and-hold strategy that has been employed thus far.
Russia has managed to secure minor gains in various sectors along the frontline, stretching from Western Zaporizhzhia in Southern Ukraine to Kupiansk in Eastern Ukraine. These incremental advancements, while seemingly insignificant in isolation, collectively represent a slow and grinding expansion of Russian control.
While these marginal advances may seem inconsequential, dismissing them as mere technicalities would be a grave mistake. Take the recent developments in Piatykhatky, for instance. Ukraine still maintains a foothold just a stone’s throw away from the Russian defensive line, but the loss of territory to its flanks has significantly intensified the pressure on their forces stationed in this pocket. The likelihood of the pocket collapsing has increased dramatically since October 8th. I cannot fathom a logical reason for Ukraine’s passive stance unless, as western media has suggested, they are carefully managing their dwindling artillery supply. Rather than prioritizing attacks based on sectors, they are focusing on specific, strategically important positions within those sectors.
We did this nonsense last year and we are doing it again.
The Western alliance dragged its feet when it came to delivering tanks and other advanced weaponry to Ukraine. The decision was not made until Britain and Poland forced Germany’s hand by publicly requesting permission to send tanks to Ukraine in January last year. This public pressure finally forced Germany to abandon its hesitation and agree to supply Ukraine with heavy weapons. The United States also agreed to send a massive load of 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine.
- How many M1 Abrams tanks does the United States army have? : 2,473
- Cost of one M1 Abrams tank: $8.5 million to $14 million
- How much money does the Biden administration still has to help Ukraine(Presidential Drawdown Authority): $4.4 billion
- How many tanks can you send using the PDA: 400 tanks
However, by the time Western tanks finally reached Ukraine, the situation on the ground in occupied areas had significantly changed, rendering heavy weaponry almost obsolete. While these weapons are still essential for Ukraine’s defense, their effectiveness would have been far greater had they been deployed earlier, in July 2022 instead of July 2023.
War is not merely a clash of individual soldiers; it is also a battle of material resources. Just as a soldier without ammunition is a sitting duck, so too is a military without a steady supply of weapons and ammunition. The ability to continuously produce and replenish these essential supplies is crucial to maintaining a fighting force and achieving victory. In this regard, the outcome of the conflict may well hinge on the relative manufacturing capabilities of the two warring nations. The side that can outproduce its adversary will have a significant advantage on the battlefield, giving its troops a better chance of prevailing.
Ukraine’s advantage of possessing highly motivated and determined troops with superior morale is being eroded by the West’s inability to consistently and rapidly provide the necessary military supplies. This deficiency is compounded by the West’s apparent inability to set clear and achievable objectives and devise a coherent strategy for achieving victory. Without these critical elements, Ukraine’s prospects for success are increasingly uncertain.
Russian economy which is not even one tenth of the size of the western world has found a way to get more artillery shells to its troops. For Putin, it is a do or die battle. He is behaving like that, doing everything he can to get an advantage. Western leaders are refusing to show a similar level of intensity.
Ukraine’s options?
In recent months, I have consistently advocated for the following prioritized priorities:
- Reduce the combat power of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Offense is the best form of defense in the Black Sea. Keeping the Russian navy’s power balance in the Black Sea in check protects the grain corridor used by Ukraine to export its grains. This allows Ukraine’s agricultural industry to grow, helping the Ukrainian economy. The biggest investors in Ukraine’s military is their own people. “According to the Strategic Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, since the beginning of the full-scale war, Ukrainians have contributed more than UAH 100 billion to support the army”. A strong Ukrainian economy will allow Ukraine to build its defense industrial complex. It offers short term benefits as well as long term benefits for Ukraine. In my opinion, this one factor trounces every other factor, including the unpredictable western aid Ukraine continues to depend on to withstand the invasion.
- Hold the frontline. While both sides will inevitably experience temporary territorial gains and losses, Ukraine should focus on safeguarding strategically crucial locations. They have demonstrated resilience in holding onto key positions since August 2022, despite setbacks in the May--August 2022 period. However, their limited artillery supply could force them to adopt a more cautious approach, potentially leading to territorial concessions. Ukraine must carefully assess which positions are worth defending and which can be relinquished without compromising their overall strategy. Aside from Kupiansk, which remains a potential flashpoint, the near-term territorial threat appears manageable.
- Degrade the Russian Air Force’s effectiveness. Russian airpower poses a persistent threat to Ukrainian forces. This threat becomes even more critical in the current situation, where Ukraine is forced to ration artillery ammunition. With limited artillery capabilities, Ukraine is more susceptible to receiving more shells from Russian forces than they can fire back. The intermittent involvement of Russian Sukhoi fighter jets in ground attacks further complicates the situation for Ukrainian defenders, especially those stationed in strategically important locations like Krykny in the Kherson sector. By regularly intercepting and destroying Russian fighter jets, Ukraine can significantly reduce the number of sorties flown by Russian pilots, diminishing the overall impact of Russian airpower.
- Everything else….
Can the West fix this?
While Western countries are producing artillery shells, the current output is insufficient to decisively push back Russian forces on the basis of artillery strength alone. Accelerating production will not be a quick fix, as it will take months to significantly increase the supply of shells. Therefore, the most effective strategy in the immediate term is to leverage the dispersal of Western weaponry to compensate for the shortage of artillery shells.
For instance, the provision of F-16 fighter jets could be accompanied by a substantial supply of air-to-ground munitions for Ukraine. This would enable Ukraine to establish air superiority in pockets, thereby disrupting Russian artillery operations and providing the necessary breathing room for Western countries to bolster Ukraine’s artillery capabilities.
The West cannot afford to drag out this war for two years. A decisive victory within a timeframe of 60 to 90 days should be the primary objective. By setting clear and ambitious goals, Western nations can galvanize their efforts and provide Ukraine with the necessary support to achieve a decisive outcome. Lingering in a prolonged stalemate, relying solely on artillery shelling for an extended period, will only prolong the suffering and undermine the prospects for a lasting resolution.
To decisively overpower the Russian army within a timeframe of 60 to 90 days, Ukraine would require a substantial influx of military support from Western allies. This includes a significant increase in the supply of artillery shells, air-defense systems, electronic warfare (EW) equipment, and advanced weaponry to facilitate the use of F-16 fighter jets.
There is only one man, who can actually do this. To create such a plan, get fellow world leaders to confidence and then see through it. I hope he walks out of his shell as early as possible, because I do not see him winning a second term without bringing the Russian invasion to an end.
Never underestimate American voters.
Never.
Ever.
