Ukraine Must Stay the Course
Until winter
While our attention was focused on major operations like the Russian advances towards Pokrovsk and the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk, the Russians have ground their way into two strategic locations in Ukraine: Vuhledar and Klishiivka. Both towns offer commanding heights in the area, providing the holder with a significant advantage in terms of firepower. Kilshiivka is still contested as both sides are not fully in control of the town.
The Russians have paid a heavy price for this grind, but the locations they attacked weren’t as ill-chosen as they had been in 2022 and 2023. They are no longer advancing mindlessly, instead paying a steep price for critical targets.
Currently, the Russians and Ukrainians are engaged in a cat-and-mouse game. Ukraine is reluctant to commit its reserves, aiming to build up enough strength to decisively break through Russian lines in occupied Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Russians are grinding their way to small strategic positions in an effort to force Ukraine to commit its reserves.
Eventually, someone will blink.
The Institute for the Study of War has already described the Ukrainian strategy as a defense in depth.
The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces.
Ukrainian forces are conducting an effective defense in depth along the frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while slowly giving ground but preventing the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the battlefield.
Ukrainian forces do face serious operational challenges and constraints, which are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue tactically significant gains. Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.
During the second half of 2022 and the first half of 2023, Ukraine successfully stalled Russian forces with an exceptionally strong mobile defense. It worked — Ukraine understands mobile defense well. But why did they transition to a defense in depth, a strategy that requires ceding territory in order to wear down enemy forces?
Let’s slowly unpack the reasoning behind this strategic shift.
The Russian armed forces are still attempting to advance along the pre-Kursk frontline. Within this advance, I can identify five distinct locations as focal points for the Russian forces.
All five areas targeted by the Russian army do have some merit. Their actions are not entirely foolish. Capturing these areas would set the stage for further Russian advances into Ukrainian territory. Of the five, the Russians have been unable to make significant progress against Kremmina, they’ve been stalled at the canal next to Chasiv Yar for months, and their advance toward Pokrovsk has not moved since August. They’ve been trying extremely hard near Kurakhove with some success, while they have succeeded in Vuhledar.
This describes the status of the old frontline. Now, let’s take a look at Kursk, the new frontline.
The lines have once again become static in Kursk Oblast. October 1 was the deadline the emperor set for his forces to clear the invaders from their homeland, but that day came and went. Ukrainian forces still control nearly 1,000 square kilometers of Russian territory, with the option to expand this if they choose.
The Russians did pull some of their elite units from the older frontline and sent them to Kursk, but it didn’t help break the Ukrainian lines. The lines bent, as if they were accommodating the Russian forces moving from occupied Ukraine.
After watching the Russians cross the Seym River to attack Ukrainian positions in Kursk (you can see the movement flow in the image below), I noted in mid-September that the Russians do not have enough strength south of the river.
When I wrote that report in mid-September, the Russians had three brigades positioned west of Ukraine’s forces in Kursk. Observing this, I made the following note.
How do they plan to supply more than 10,000 troops stuck on the other side of the river under these conditions? Once they cross, it’s a slippery slope. The only option, once they’ve committed to the southern side of the Seym River, is to keep pouring in more resources to sustain the sector.
As expected, the Russians have done it. They now have the 106th Airborne Division, 119th Air Assault Regiment, 137th Airborne Regiment, 200th Arctic Motor Rifle Brigade, 234th Air Assault Regiment, 56th Air Assault Regiment, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and the 51st Airborne Regiment deployed.
Holy moly! All the regiments with “Air” in their name are right there next to the Seym River. You can see their grouping in the green and white oval in the image below.
Ukraine did not destroy the temporary bridge or attempt to close the corridor when the first Russian brigade appeared. Instead, they let the bridge remain and allowed more elite Russian units to move in. Then, they deployed some of their own units to the south of where the Russians had gathered. Check the blue and white circle in the image below.
Ukraine moved at least five brigades to this section after the Russians crossed the river. Could they have sent those units to Vuhledar instead to stop the Russians from capturing it?
Let’s imagine they had done that. Ukraine would have held Vuhledar but committed its brigades to the older frontline, while the Russians would have gradually chipped away at Ukrainian positions in Kursk.
Instead of fighting the Russians on Russian territory, Ukraine would be fighting them on Ukrainian soil. It’s a difficult decision to make, but one that must be made at some point.
The Russians are attacking as hard as they can on the pre-Kursk frontline because they want Ukraine to commit its reserve forces there. Ukraine, however, wants the opposite — it seeks to draw more and more Russian troops into Kursk.
It’s a battle of wits, and both sides are losing territory in the process. I firmly believe that Ukraine should stay the course. They need to defend Ukrainian territory using their depth while forcing the Russians to increase their troop strength in Kursk.
I think Ukraine must continue to prioritize its Kursk operations over those in the rest of the theater.
Thanks for reading. The mainstream media seems clueless and perhaps uninterested. The war is getting closer to the end. Now, more than ever, it’s crucial to make critical information about Ukraine accessible. That’s why I’ve made 300 stories available to the public in 2024, inlcuding this one.
