Ukraine Sets the Stage to Win the War
Russian control over Crimea is slipping
Higher-Highs.
When Ukraine launched an assault on the Saky airfield in Crimea in early January, it marked the largest attack on Crimea since the onset of Russia’s invasion. The term could be applied once more when Ukraine targeted the Belbek airfield in Crimea by the end of January.
Both attacks proved successful. Looking back to June 2023, we observe Ukraine steadily amplifying the size, scale, intensity, and reach of their assaults on Russian assets in Crimea.
The steady notch of higher-highs is the direct result of a seven month campaign by Ukraine that left Russian air-defense in Crimea, battered, bruised, and bleeding.
Russians find themselves partially blinded in Crimea, and Ukraine is poised to exploit this vulnerability further. The Russians have only themselves to blame for their predicament. I see no easy way out of this situation. It’s not a matter of it getting better before it worsens; rather, it seems destined to deteriorate further before any improvement is possible.
Kremlin got nicely played by Ukraine.
Following months of back-and-forth, Russia ultimately withdrew from Snake Island, a small landmass on the western edge of the Black Sea. Its close proximity to Ukrainian shores rendered it susceptible to Ukrainian artillery fire. Ukraine effectively made it inhospitable for Russian troops. Still reeling from the loss of their billion-dollar Moskva cruiser in April, the Russians lacked the resolve to continue the fight. Consequently, they opted to retreat and vacate the island in June 2022.
Exactly one year later, in June 2023, Ukrainian missiles struck three oil platforms in the Western Black Sea. These platforms had been occupied by Russian troops, who had installed radars and other communication equipment. Serving as Russia’s westernmost outposts in the Black Sea, these rigs enabled them to monitor movement in the area.
Ukraine became increasingly active during September 2023, marking one of its busiest months. On September 11th, they assumed full control of three oil rigs. Following this, they targeted a submarine and a ship docked at the Sevastopol naval base. The subsequent day saw Ukrainian commandos land in Cape Tarkhankut, where they destroyed an S400 air-defense battery along with radars and communication equipment. Just one week later, two storm shadow missiles struck Russia’s naval headquarters in Sevastopol, Crimea.
By the end of November, Russia had lost two S400s in Crimea and three units stationed in Luhansk. The impairment was beginning to extend from the west to the east. In December 2023 alone, Russians lost eight fighter jets to Ukraine. On December 26th, Russia suffered a significant blow when the landing ship Novocherkassk was sunk by storm shadow missiles. Interestingly, the ship was not in the western waters of Crimea but rather on the eastern side, near or at the Crimean port of Feodosia.
On January 4th, Ukraine launched a barrage of missiles at the Saky airbase, resulting in the destruction of radar systems and the control center. While details remain unclear, reports suggest there were approximately 10 explosions.
By this time, it must have become evident to the Russians that Ukraine was targeting both the eastern and western fronts of Crimea at will. Therefore, it came as no great surprise when the Russians deployed their A50 early warning aircraft to bolster their air-defense capabilities. However, Ukraine promptly neutralized this threat by bringing down this aircraft as well. The location of the incident was over the Sea of Azov, on the eastern side of Crimea.
On January 31st, Ukraine fired 24 missiles at Belbek airport. While the media highlighted the loss of two Russian jets with one damaged, Ukraine’s strike resulted in far more than just the destruction of aircraft:
A video capturing one of the missiles hitting its target enabled OSINT geolocation, indicating that one missile struck the underground command post of the air base. Unofficial information also points to the possible destruction of radar stations, particularly the Nebo type radars maintained by the russian federation at the Belbek airfield.
The Russians initially assumed that Ukraine’s attack on Crimea targeted the Black Sea Fleet. While this was indeed one of Ukraine’s objectives, it was not the sole focus. Instead, it served as a secondary benefit resulting from the disruption of the air-defense umbrella in Crimea.
Russians cannot fix this. This is not a territorial loss that can be recovered by sending wave after wave of meat squads to die and then boast about man power advantage in meetings. Russian air-defense in Crimea is broken. They must undertake a comprehensive overhaul starting from Snake Island. However, navigating the open seas poses a challenge when key naval bases such as Sevastopol and Feodosia are under constant threat.
The only alternative is to bolster their air defense arsenal and repair the damage inflicted by Ukraine. However, manufacturing these systems is a formidable challenge. Moreover, even if they manage to replenish their equipment, Ukraine is likely to target them once more. It’s akin to progressing from Stage 1 to Stage 2 of an ailment; avoiding treatment may seem easy at first, but once the situation escalates to Stage 3, rectifying the mistakes becomes near impossible.
Certain mistakes are not reversible.
I anticipate that Russia will achieve some territorial victories over the next eight weeks, given their advantageous artillery capabilities. However, despite these gains, Russia is rapidly approaching the loss of Crimea as a logistical stronghold.
The Russians abandoned Snake Island due to mounting pressure. While Crimea is larger and they may not evacuate, its strategic value diminishes if it becomes untenable.
The situation isn’t poised to improve for the Russians anytime soon; rather, it’s likely to deteriorate further. Ukraine’s systematic dismantling of Russian air-defense assets, radars, and communication equipment over the last seven months has exacerbated the conflict. Ukraine is still attacking with their age old soviet era fighter jets. The dynamism and flexibility they will get after receiving the F16s will be many folds higher than what they have today.
If Russia cannot defend its military assets in Crimea today, how will they respond when Ukraine starts its F16 sorties? They will struggle even more. Ukraine has already softened the Russian response to the arrival of F16s. The string of fighter jet losses they suffered in the last two months has already forced the Russians to stay deeper into the occupied territory, ceding space to Ukrainian pilots. The sky in Ukraine feels a whole lot better for hosting the F16s today than it did three months ago.
The only limitation I see for Ukraine moving forward is the number of long-range missiles they possess.
Thankfully, more missiles are on their way.
Russia cannot stay in the war without Crimea. They cannot.
- Black Sea Fleet is already locked up in the Port of Novorossiysk +
- Russian Air Force compelled to operate deeper +
- Inhospitable Crimea +
- F16s
= ?
