Ukraine Takes the Attack to Moscow
Putin in trouble
Before we delve into the impact of Ukraine’s intense drone attacks across Russia yesterday, I’d like to begin with two key pieces of information.
- Putin’s army still refuses to recruit from the Moscow and St. Petersburg areas. Any recruitment numbers you see coming from these regions are the result of targeted efforts. The recruits are still primarily immigrants and specific ethnic groups living in the area.
- Discontent against Putin’s regime has increased since Ukraine invaded Kursk. A 5% drop may not seem significant, but it is still a movement in the opposite direction. This shift would never have occurred if not for the failure of Putin and his army to stop Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk.
It is against this backdrop that we need to view Ukraine’s attacks on military facilities and other economic assets in 15 oblasts across Russia. While the attacks covered a significant portion of Russian territory, the one in Moscow is the most notable.
Why is the attack on Moscow a big deal?
Putin could easily dismiss the attacks on other regions, either by putting a positive spin on them or completely ignoring them. He and his allies are already downplaying Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk, making it seem insignificant to the Russian public. They would have done the same if it weren’t for the significant blows Ukraine dealt in the Moscow region.
I’m still scratching my head — how on earth did Ukraine manage to hit the Moscow Oil Refinery and Kashira Power Station in the Moscow region?
According to Fabian Hoffman, Doctoral Research Fellow at University of Oslo, “Moscow is protected by a ring of 22 S-300/S-400 air defense sites, most of which should cover the refinery. Additionally, there are at least 9 recently redeployed Pantsir S1/S2 systems that should have been able to protect against this type of drone attack.
The inability of Russia’s air and missile defense systems to protect against relatively crude long-range one-way drone attacks is surprising. While the S-300/S-400 have demonstrated utility in Ukraine, they appear to consistently underperform in territorial point defense”.
When Russia launched its largest missile and drone attack since the start of the invasion on August 27th, Ukraine promised a response — and that’s exactly what happened yesterday.
In one sense, this is Ukraine building deterrence against future Russian missile attacks. They have executed retaliatory strikes many times before, but this time they went for scale, launching more than 160 drones across 15 regions inside Russia.
The Kremlin must be baffled, trying to figure out what went wrong with their defense of Moscow. Ukraine did not use their missiles, which I suspect have the capability to reach Moscow. Instead, the entire attack was carried out using long-range drones — slow-moving, lower-payload drones that should not have been difficult for gunners to take out. Yet, these drones found their way to their targets in the Moscow region. I would have thought Putin would spare no effort to cover Moscow with air defenses and mobile response units.
Clearly, that hasn’t happened. Of course, Moscow is a large area, and it’s challenging to protect every inch of the sky. That’s the problem with air defense: you need to protect every inch, while the enemy needs just one inch to sneak through. This is why taking out the “arrows” will never end the attack — taking out the “archer” will.
The point is, if Putin is unable to protect Moscow against slow-moving, long-range drones, how does he plan to defend his assets when Ukraine’s Neptune missiles, Palianytsia drone missiles, or newly developed ballistic missiles target Russian military and economic assets in Moscow? He will need to prepare to absorb some of that cost, which will become increasingly prohibitive for his inflation-ridden economy.
It was no accident that two thermal power plants supplying power to the Moscow region came under attack. The Konakovo Power Station is one of the largest energy producers in Central Russia, with an installed capacity of 2,520 MW, and the Kashira Power Plant has a capacity of 1,910 MW.
The Kremlin will not waste time trying to repair the damaged power plants, but all of this comes at a cost. How many power plants can they protect if they are still struggling to secure their refineries and oil depots? If they cannot defend against drones, how will they handle missiles with undoubtedly larger payloads?
Whatever damage Russia sustained yesterday is just the beginning. Ukraine has the potential to escalate this to a much higher level.
Ukraine is standing on its own.
The most significant aspect of yesterday’s attack is that not a single weapon used by Ukraine was provided by Western partners; everything was manufactured domestically. The deterrence Ukraine is building is entirely self-reliant and not owned by any other country.
The number I’m most eager to see is the total number of drones Ukraine deployed yesterday. On August 27th, Russia launched 236 missiles and drones at Ukraine, so Ukraine’s response should include at least one more. The message should be clear: if Russia attacks with 236 aerial weapons, Ukraine will respond with at least 236 — plus one.
The Russians take pride in sending such messages. Every time a European leader visits Kyiv, they fire a missile. They even did it when an African delegation visited Kyiv. So, if Ukraine responds with “plus one,” Putin’s army will indeed get the message, and over time, it might temper the Kremlin’s willingness to embrace unlimited aggression.
One other important point: Ukraine delivered a clear message to the Russian army planners yesterday — if you attack our electric grid, we will respond in kind. By knocking out two thermal plants in the Moscow region, Ukraine highlighted the vulnerability of Russia’s vast electric grid.
Russia is a large country, and not everything can be protected. While Ukraine has so far avoided targeting these assets, they now must carefully gauge how far to push. But push they must, or else Russia will continue raising the cost of war for Ukraine without paying a similar price for its actions.
That cannot be allowed.
Thanks for reading. Making critical information on Ukraine accessible is one way to fight misinformation. That’s why I’ve made 264 stories free to the public in 2024, including this one.
