What’s happening in Kursk? A whole lot of Putin’s B.S.

He is just getting started. Expect more.

Over the past few weeks — may be even months — I’ve been focusing not on Ukraine winning the war in Kursk, or Russia gaining an advantage, or any other military outcomes. My emphasis has been on the “misinformation” surrounding the war.

So far, we’ve only scratched the surface, but soon it will reveal itself fully. Please prepare, as the first wave of Putin’s intensified propaganda campaign is now underway, with him leading the charge.

According to Putin, “Russian forces have encircled 2,000 Ukrainian troops in an area roughly six by fifteen kilometers.” He also claimed that Russian forces would ensure the safety of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).

LOL.

The Kursk terrain is particularly challenging for Russia to execute envelopment operations, given its openness on multiple fronts. Ukraine could counter from various directions if trouble arises in any sector, potentially rebalancing the lines.

However, isolating a brigade-sized force is still feasible at the edges.

Notably, Russia’s 155th Naval Infantry Brigade faced a similar predicament just a week ago. Russian forces swiftly reinforced the area with multiple VDV brigades to rescue the isolated troops. Take a look at the screenshot I took on October 18th, noting the distance between the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and the nearest Russian positions in that sector.

Now, take a look at the Russian VDV elements moving to relieve pressure on the 155th. This is where the Russian lines stood on the western salient of Kursk Oblast as of October 26th.

Getting stranded at the edge is possible, but you can still move your troops to provide relief. The 155th did end up caught at the edge. On October 18th, I even wondered whether Ukraine would seize the opportunity to strike decisively, perhaps capture the commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade — known for committing severe war crimes — or keep the lines flexible to draw more Russian troops into the area.

As it turned out, the Russians moved in additional troops. That’s what happened. But nothing even close to what Putin claimed has actually occurred.

On top of this, the ISW reported the following: “Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to fight in Ukraine’s main salient in Kursk Oblast on October 26, but the frontline did not change.”

They also noted, “Ukrainian forces recently launched a likely reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault on Russian positions in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.”

To summarize:

• The frontline in Kursk remain unchanged during the period of our analysis,
• There is no indication on the map of any Ukrainian brigade significantly advancing beyond their lines.
• Ukraine has counter-attacked in Glushkovsky Raion.

So, why has the Czar taken it upon himself to spread such propaganda?

The reason lies in the Kremlin’s timeline, which promised Russians that Ukrainian forces would be cleared from Kursk by early this month — a deadline that has now passed. Making matters worse for him, Putin now needs to justify bringing North Korean troops into Kursk Oblast. He doesn’t want the average Russian, or his supporters in the West, to start questioning if the situation is truly dire, especially since he now relies on North Korean reinforcements to sustain the war effort.

So, he’s flipping the narrative. By making such an outrageous claim, he ensures media coverage and gives military bloggers on all sides something to discuss. Now, instead of focusing on North Korean troops bolstering Russian lines in Kursk, the narrative shifts to Ukrainian forces supposedly encircled in Kursk Oblast.

No need to fall for it.

Ukraine will not keep its lines in Kursk static; they must remain dynamic. The lines need to be flexible enough to draw more Russian troops into the sector, but not so flexible that they risk breaking. I understand that this strategy may be nerve-wracking for us, as the battle in Kursk will fluctuate at a relentless pace. However, we must recognize that unless Ukraine adopts this approach, there’s no chance that Russia will reposition its troops from occupied Ukraine back onto Russian territory.

The key point for us is this: How does the current Russian troop strength in Kursk Oblast compare to the past? That is the only indicator we must rely on.

It continues to increase.

If things are going so well for Putin, why does he keep deploying more troops to Kursk Oblast? And why did he request that Kim Jong Un supply troops for the fight in Kursk?

The initial batch of North Korean troops — about 3,000 — expected to arrive in Kursk Oblast, seems more of a test to gauge the Western response. This number won’t be nearly enough, though. Putin loses around 1,500 troops each day to this war, so if these North Korean troops are deployed to the front lines, they could be depleted within days.

What Putin really needs is a steady influx of North Korean forces, ideally tens of thousands arriving monthly, to reach the 100,000-strong troop count necessary to credibly challenge Ukraine’s position in Kursk Oblast. He’s likely aware of this requirement and is laying the groundwork with Kim Jong Un’s support.

Starting small allows him to test the Western response. If there’s no pushback, we can expect regular deployments of 3,000 North Korean troops to the front, gradually normalizing their presence in the conflict. For Putin, any propaganda that distracts from North Korean involvement and avoids highlighting Russia’s weakness is worth pursuing.

While the West’s response remains uncertain, especially from the United States, I do have a recommendation for Ukraine: stay focused on your objectives in Kursk Oblast. If possible, launch a dedicated, targeted campaign against North Korean forces there.

Strategically, Ukraine doesn’t need to adjust its approach. The objective remains the same: draw 100,000 Russian troops to Kursk. Once that’s achieved, consider opening another front in Kursk Oblast or perhaps in a nearby region.

Thanks for reading. The war is getting closer to the end. Now, more than ever, it’s crucial to make critical information about Ukraine accessible. That’s why I’ve made 310 stories available to the public in 2024, including this one.